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For publically listed New Zealand (NZ) companies with a balance date post-December 2016, 
the disclosure of Key Audit Matters will become mandatory. This requirement, aimed at 
enhancing the information value of audit reports, is a direct response to the recent Global 
Financial Crisis. Further, many auditors and market participants have voluntarily expanded 
these requirements and include a materiality threshold disclosure. Despite the significant 
response from regulators, little research has been conducted which explores the possible 
impacts of this enhanced materiality disclosure. 
This quantitative research, using an experiment based research design, aims to investigate 
whether the disclosure of materiality thresholds will have an impact on both the decisions of 
non-professional investors and their perceived quality of the audit. 
The results of this study suggest that with a large (ten percent) materiality threshold 
disclosure, non-professional investors will reduce their equity based investment, in favour of 
risk-free NZ Government Bonds. Alternatively, non-professional investors perceive no 
change in the quality of audit following small (five percent) or large materiality threshold 
disclosure, due to lack of statistical significance.  
Overall, this research tentatively supports the public disclosure of materiality thresholds, 








Keywords: materiality threshold disclosure, audit quality, audit report 
4 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………..……6 
1.1 Background………………………………………...…………………………….…..6 
1.2 Research Problem…………………………………………………………….……....8 
1.3 Research Design………………………………………………………………...……9 
 
2. LIMITATIONS ………………………………………………………………...……10 
 
3. MOTIVATION OF THE RESEARCH…………………………………….……...…12 
3.1 A New Long Form Audit Report…………………………………………………...12 
3.2 Lack of Prior Research………………………...……………………………………12 
3.3   Market Participants’ Voluntary Disclosure …….……………………….……….…13 
3.4   Audit Expectations Gap………………………….…………………………………13 
 
4. LITERATURE REVIEW………………………………………………………….…15 
4.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………15 
4.2 History of the Audit Report…………………………………………………………15 
4.3 Determining Materiality – Regulation…………………………….………………..16 
4.4 Determining Materiality – Practical Considerations………………………………..18 
4.5 Disclosing Materiality………………………………………………………………20 
4.6 Disparity Between Auditors in Determining Materiality………………...…………21 
4.7 Disparity Between Auditors’ and Users’ in Determining Materiality……………...23 
4.8 Disclosure of Materiality – Benefits……………..…………………………………25 
4.9 Disclosure of Materiality – Disadvantages……………………..…………………..26 
4.10 Previous Research on the Disclosure of Materiality………….……….……………27 
4.11 Summary…………………………………………………………………………....30 
 
5. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT………………………………………………..…31 
 
6. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH APPROACH…………….....………………34 
6.1   Methodology………………………….………………………………………….…34 
6.2   Sample Selection………………………………...……………………………….…34 
5 
 
6.3   Design of Experiment…………………………….…………………………………39 
6.4   Research Analysis…………………………………………………………………..46 
 
7. RESULTS………………………………….……….……………………………...…48 
7.1   Study Validity……………………….………….………………………………..…48 
7.2   Investment Decision………………….……………………………………………..58 
7.3   Perceived Audit Quality……………………………….……………………………60 
7.4   Summary of Findings………………………………….……………………………61 
 
8. DISCUSSION……………………………………………………………………..…62 
8.1   Purpose……………………………………………………………………………...62 
8.2   Investment Decision……………………………………………………………...…62 




10. CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE……………………………………………...73 
 









“Where were the auditors, the guardians and 
gatekeepers, the professionals we should be able to 
trust?”  
Cooper and Grose (2010, p. 19) 
Following the Global Financial Crises (GFC) of 2008-2009, the public were questioning the 
extent of what had happened, and more importantly, why? Cooper and Grose (2010) asked 
this question of auditors. What role they had played in the collapse of world markets, and 
what was going to be done to solve the problem. Specifically, Cooper and Grose (2010) 
considered whether the world would see another “implosion of an international accounting 
firm” (p. 163). For many, this postulation brings back memories of the collapse of Arthur 
Andersen, not eight years earlier. 
Consequentially, regulated changes to the auditing profession are now being implemented. 
International regulators have been looking at ways to better audit quality and to improve the 
audit report (IAASB, 2011; PCAOB, 2011). Industry participants have actively been 
engaging in this drive for change (Deloitte, 2016; KPMG, 2016; PWC, 2015). Additionally, 
The New Zealand Financial Markets Authority (FMA), with greater powers under the newly 
enacted Financial Markets Conduct Act (2013)  and the Auditor Regulation Act (2011), now 
release reports every six months regarding their reviews of audit quality of New Zealand 
listed entity audits. 
In the wake of the GFC, there have been sporadic changes to improve audit quality. 
Regulators have been investigating the additional disclosure of materiality (and materiality 
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thresholds) within the audit report (IAASB, 2011; PCAOB, 2011). This is likely derived from 
the belief that  “good materiality judgements [are] crucial to an effective audit” (Mckee & 
Eilifsen, 2000, p. 8). Further, audit risk (the foundation of the current risk-based audit 
approach) cannot be considered without reference to materiality (Mckee & Eilifsen, 2000). 
Therefore it can understood why regulators would want to disclose materiality to users, 
assisting in their risk-based assessment of an entity’s annual result.   
In 2013, the United States (US) Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) 
proposed the idea of disclosing ‘Key Audit Matters’ in the standard audit report. By January 
2015, the International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 701: Communicating key audit matters in 
the independent auditors report and ISA 700 (revised): Forming an opinion and reporting on 
financial statements, had been approved by the International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board (IAASB)1 (IAASB(b), 2015). These new standards, along with a raft of 
other changes to auditing standards, would apply to audits that started on or after 15 
December 2016. One of the primary objectives of these changes was to increase audit quality 
(IAASB(b), 2015). From a New Zealand standpoint, the External Reporting Board (XRB) has 
adopted the New Zealand (NZ) equivalents to ISA 700 and ISA 701. These require the 
reporting of Key Audit Matters, including additional descriptive information regarding 
materiality (ISA (NZ) 700(Revised), 2015 - Section 38(c)). 
While New Zealand auditors and companies are preparing for the disclosure of Key Audit 
Matters (and the additional disclosures around materiality), some overseas companies are 
already adopting. The Vodafone Group in the United Kingdom (UK) are already disclosing 
the new ‘enhanced audit report’ in their 2014/ 2015 annual report (Vodafone Group Plc, 
2015). Specifically, Vodafone presents the dollar value of planning materiality, along with its 
                                               
1 Part of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) 
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basis for determination. New Zealand companies have recently followed suit, where recently, 
the Contact Energy audit report has disclosed, similar to Vodafone Group, the dollar value of 
materiality and its basis of determination (Contact Energy, 2017). 
 
1.2 Research Problem 
Gray, Turner, Coram, and Mock (2011) in their stakeholder discussions identify a consensus 
among some stakeholders. Specifically, they identified that a simple stamp from auditors 
which said ‘ok’ would be a sufficient substitute for the current unqualified audit report (p. 
673). Mock, Turner, Gray, and Coram (2009) suggests that not all user’s read the audit report 
and that most glance to see if the opinion is qualified and signed off by a ‘Big N’ auditor.  
Therefore, there is concern over what use and additional value, increasing audit report 
disclosures would bring. From an academic view, there are scant research articles that 
explore the impact of disclosing materiality (or materiality thresholds). Furthermore, and 
despite the lack of prior research, regulators are pushing forward with further audit report 
disclosures, such as Key Audit Matters (ISA (NZ) 701, 2015).  
Therefore the aim of this thesis is to investigate what effect the disclosure of materiality 
thresholds will have on the decisions of audit report users (specifically, non-professional 
investors). It will focus on the following point: 
1. Will investment decisions of non-professional investors change as a result of 
materiality threshold disclosure in the audit report? 
Furthermore, with increasing materiality disclosure, financial statement users may identify 
this as auditors passing on responsibility (R. Fisher, 1993). Alternatively, they may perceive 
the audit report as providing less assurance. Therefore, the following point is also considered: 
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2. Will stakeholders perceive materiality threshold disclosure as reducing the quality 
of the audit opinion? 
This study does not investigate the effect of a definition or description of materiality 
disclosure. Instead, it focuses on the disclosure of a materiality threshold which is currently 
being presented by many market participants (refer to chapter 1.1).  
Regardless, with a lack of prior research and with the regulators focused on pushing through 
audit report disclosure changes, findings from this study will help in identifying any potential 
benefits or issue. Further, this study will assist in identifying whether public materiality 
threshold disclosure is appropriate.   
 
1.3 Research Design 
This study uses the neoclassical theory of investor risk preference to derive the hypotheses. 
To test these hypotheses, an experimental design has been developed which uses non-
professional investors (proxied by undergraduate students) as research participants. The aim 
is to assess how changes in materiality threshold disclosure will change investor decisions 
and perceptions of audit quality. The research design seeks to determine whether statistically 
significant effects, based on ANOVA and bivariate T-tests, are present. The results will form 
a stable foundation for further study, along with identifying potential benefits or issues with 







The limitations are identified and discussed in detail within the study. However in summary: 
This study has incorporated sample sizes of 15-17 (49 in total) participants per cell. While 
this is an appropriate size to draw reasonable conclusions, future studies would benefit from 
using larger sample sizes. 
The participants used are undergraduate students from the University of Canterbury. While 
substantial research has been identified which supports the use of undergraduate students, 
along with significant consideration of the research design, the use of undergraduate students 
as non-professional investors has limitations. This is reflected in experience and knowledge 
of investing, company analysis, risk preferences, and understanding of audit report 
information. While several checks in this study identify that these are not significant issues, it 
may limit the conclusions drawn.  
While every effort was made to create realism, the participant investment was distributed 
during classes and participants knew the purpose of the experiment was for academic 
research. Furthermore, a hypothetical company (which included extracts of financial 
information and audit report) and investment decision was formulated for participants. On 
this basis, there is a general limitation that the study does not have sufficient realism. 
However, this is mitigated by statistical validity and reliability tests performed (refer to 
chapter 7).  
Due to these limitations, this study will lack some external validly and therefore limit the 
generalisation of the findings to the population.  
While this research is bound in the theory of the rational investor (refer to chapter 5), all 
investors in practice will have slightly different risk profiles, perceptions, and investment 
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strategies. For instance, some investors may only choose sustainable investments for their 
portfolios, having limitations on the results obtained. However, this variance in investor 
profiles means that any research of investor decisions will have problems in projecting results 
to all investors.  
This study has utilised materiality at the five percent and ten percent intervals of net profit 
before tax. While substantial prior research supports the use of these benchmarks (refer to 
chapter 6.3.4), it is likely that large listed entities would not have materiality benchmarks 
which are as high as ten percent. This is supported by anecdotal evidence, based on 
discussions with various professional auditors over the duration of this research, where they 
noted that the materiality benchmarks for listed entities are not this high. Notwithstanding, 
this thesis is based on a substantial amount of prior research (not neccesaraly relating to audit 
materialy threshold disclosure), and larger materiality values would still be possible for non-
listed entities, which are the next target for materiality threshold disclosure (i.e. from 15 
December 2018 (ISA (NZ) 701, 2015)). 
Lastly, there are certain assumptions within this study on which the conclusions are drawn. 
For instance, participants are assumed to have basic knowledge of the key accounting and 
auditing terms such as profit, assets, and audit report. Further, participants are assumed to 
have an understanding of the role and function of the capital markets. Several narrations are 
included in the experiment design to explain some of these key terms within this study, along 
with the students used mainly having a commerce as their Bachelor. However, a basic 
understanding of these particular assumptions is required to ensure appropriate and valid 





3. MOTIVATION OF THE RESEARCH 
3.1 A New Long Form Audit Report 
The audit report has changed significantly over the decades, from being a mere certificate 
(Church, Davis, & McCracken, 2008) to long form audit reports (R. Fisher, 1993). The recent 
inclusion of the Key Audit Matters (ISA (NZ) 701, 2015), including addition materiality 
disclosures, is another path on the road of enhancing the value the audit provides. However, 
with all new initiatives, this provides a need for academic research to investigate and verify 
whether the suggested benefits are as anticipated by regulators and standard setters.  
 
3.2 Lack of Prior Research 
In the wake of the GFC, regulators made swift and significant changes to the standard audit 
report, including the new requirements to disclose Key Audit Matters. Researchers have been 
slow to react, and there is a small amount of research before the GFC. This has resulted in 
limited research being available to inform regulators, standard setters, and practitioners 
(Davis, 2007; Doxey, 2013; M. Fisher, 1990; Gutierrez, Minutti-Meza, Tatum, & Vulcheva, 
2015; Ruhnke, Pronobis, & Michel, 2014). (Davis, 2007; Doxey, 2013; M. Fisher, 1990). 
Davis (2007) and M. Fisher (1990) both use proxy investors in an experimental market 
setting to examine market efficiency, following the disclosure of materiality thresholds. 
Importantly, both find increased market efficiency through materiality threshold disclosure. 
Doxey (2013) expands on this by examining materiality threshold disclosure in light of an 
anchoring effect and subsequent effects on audit quality and perceptions on litigation. 
Further, Ruhnke et al. (2014) explores the impact of materiality threshold disclosure on credit 
lending decisions.  
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Due to the limited number of studies and varying focus points, additional studies are needed 
to reveal the likely impact of materiality threshold disclosure on investment decisions of non-
professional investors and their perceptions of audit quality (i.e. the two aims of this study). 
Furthermore, several prior studies (both relating to materiality threshold disclosure and not) 
have suggested further study in this area (Doxey, 2013; Gray et al., 2011; Houghton, Jubb, & 
Kend, 2011; Vanstraelen, Schelleman, Hofmann, & Meuwissen, 2011). 
 
3.3 Market Participants’ Voluntary Disclosure 
As stated in chapter 3.2, regulators made swift action following the GFC. The result is that 
despite the lack of prior research, and despite various studies identifying potential problems 
with additional audit report disclosures (refer to chapter 4.9), the regulations relating to the 
disclosure of Key Audit Matters have been settled and adopted (ISA (NZ) 701, 2015). 
Subsequently, market participants have acted to also incorporate the disclosure of materiality 
thresholds as part of their revised audit reports. Therefore, with the adoption of ISA (NZ) 701 
occurring for NZX listed entities who balance date is post-December 2016, and with market 
participants pressing forward with their own voluntary disclosure of materiality thresholds, 
further research is desperately needed to examine any potential impacts.  
 
3.4 Audit Expectations Gap 
There is a significant array of academic research on the audit expectations gap debate 
(Hojskov, 1998; Houghton et al., 2011; Humphrey, Moizer, & Turley, 1993; McEnroe & 
Martens, 2001; Monroe & Woodliff, 1993; Porter, 1993; Sikka, Puxty, Willmott, & Cooper, 
1998). Specifically, the audit expectations gap deals with the differences in perceptions of 
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auditor duties and responsibilities, and related disclosures provided in audit reports, by the 
public (Monroe & Woodliff, 1993). This is an age-old area of auditing research and one that 
is unlikely to be resolved soon. This study will aid the debate by investigating the effect of 
additional audit report disclosures, being the materiality threshold disclosure, on investing 
decisions and perceptions of audit quality. Further, this study will assess how these investing 





























4. LITERATURE REVIEW 
4.1 Introduction 
First, this literature review explores the history of audit reports, from its humble beginnings 
to the current long form audit reports and Key Audit Matter disclosures. Second, I explore 
how materiality is determined by regulators and practitioners, along with a practical view of 
materiality threshold disclosure in publically listed audit reports. Third, I examine the audit 
expectations gap with regard to auditors’ and users’ materiality perceptions. Fourth, I assess 
both the benefits and disadvantages of public disclosure of materiality thresholds. Lastly, I 
review the limited prior research on audit materiality threshold disclosure. 
 
4.2 History of the Audit Report 
Like many business innovations, the audit report began with humble beginnings. Church et 
al., (2008, p. 2) explain how the audit report in the UK first started off as a certificate and was 
not standardised. Ultimately, this meant that there could be as many types of ‘certificates’ as 
there were auditors who prepared them. This had profound implications regarding 
comparability and understandability.  
From a US setting, following the stock market crash of 1929, incremental improvements 
were made, and by 1934 a standardised report was in use (Church et al., 2008). In 1992 
(following the 1987 ‘Black Monday’ stock market crash (Carlson, 2007)) an international 
based exposure draft was released proposing a move to a long form audit report (R. Fisher, 
1993). By 2009, ISA 700 (2009) was approved by the ISAAB which dictated a set of 
guidelines (with support from other ISA’s) for audit report disclosures. Despite these 
incremental changes, the audit report was still considered by many to be a pass/fail type 
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report on the back of boilerplate language (Church et al., 2008). Further, it is clear that audit 
reporting changes were derived only from external shocks to the global stock markets, rather 
than pre-emptive action from the auditing profession.  
Moving through 2008-2009 (where the GFC was still active), the public was searching for 
someone to blame, and it was only a matter of time before they set their sights on auditors. 
On the back of this, many researchers were focused on enhancing the communicative value 
of the auditor’s report (Church et al., 2008; Manson & Zaman, 2001; Turner, 2003). Further, 
regulators saw the need for a more radical change, departing from evolutionary wording 
changes to more revolutionary ‘Key Audit Matter’ reporting. From this, the IAASB approved 
a raft of new and revised standards including a major revision to ISA 700 (ISA 700, 2009). 
The revolutionary change resulted in an ‘enhanced audit report’ which required the disclosure 
of Key Audit Matters (in accordance with ISA (NZ) 701 (2015)) including, among other 
things, an increase in materiality definitions and descriptions (section 38(c)). This was to be 
effective for reporting periods on or after 15 December 2016 ((ISA (NZ) 700(Revised), 
2015). However, individual jurisdictions have frequently allowed for transition periods, such 
as the two-year transition period for New Zealand listed entities, aimed at ensuring audit 
quality is maintained (XRB, 2015).  
 
4.3 Determining Materiality - Regulation 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the accounting standard-setting body in 
the US, defines materiality. An “omission or misstatement of an item is material in a financial 
report, if, in light of surrounding circumstances, the magnitude of the item is such that it is 
probable that the judgement of a reasonable person relying upon the report would have 
changed” (FASB, 1980). This is consistent with the New Zealand Equivalent to ISA 320’s, 
17 
 
(ISA (NZ) 320, 2011) definition. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) amend the 
term ‘user’ in their definition of materiality and replace it with the term ‘average prudent 
investor’ (SEC, 1999). This is done to reflect the nature of their business as a financial market 
regulator. Regardless, the fundamental definition of materiality has remained constant with 
the view that that materiality judgements are to be made in light of the target audience.  
ISA (NZ) 320 (2011) is the primary (New Zealand equivalent) audit standard currently 
applicable which dictates basic guidelines of what materiality is (as above) and how it should 
be determined. Specifically, materiality must be formed in light of surrounding 
circumstances, along with incorporating both quantitative and qualitative characteristics in 
the final number used. Furthermore, it is to be ‘determined’ by auditors as opposed to being 
‘calculated’ (ISA (NZ) 320, 2011). This language is fundamental to ensuring that qualitative 
factors are incorporated into the final materiality value. The Statement of Standard 
Accounting Practice-6, albeit superseded, puts it into more layman’s terms, explaining how 
materiality percentages are not magic numbers and that the nature and amount of 
misstatements must be considered together when formulating materiality (SSAP-6, 1985).  
To enable auditors to apply materiality, ISA (NZ) 320 (2011) dictates three levels of 
materiality be used in an audit engagement, which is consistent with the international ISA. 
Firstly, planning materiality is used to determine the overall audit strategy. Therefore, 
planning materiality determines the overall extent, scope, and subsequent cost of the audit 
(Waters & Tiller, 1997, p. 115). Secondly, performance materiality is considered at the 
individual class or transaction level (ISA (NZ) 320, 2011). This is used by the auditor to give 
an opinion of whether the individual transactions are materiality misstated. Finally, 
evaluation materiality is used at the end of the audit to determine if overall, the financial 
statements are fairly presented in all material respects (Rooij, 2009, p. 139).  
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4.4 Determining Materiality – Practical Considerations 
An important theme of materiality per the professional standards is the concept of auditor 
judgement. Chewning and Higgs (2002) suggest that an absence of defining rules may be due 
to the potential legal implications. This is supported by the common theme of the public and 
creditors, whereby they will target auditors in the event of a company collapse (often 
performed, as the auditor is the only entity remaining with the capacity to pay damages). The 
recent New Zealand Feltex Carpets case is a testament to this where the press were quick to 
identify the auditors (Vaughan, 2013). The deliberate caution from regulators to use a 
judgement based approach to determining materiality is perhaps best summarised with the 
idea that judgement cannot be replaced by mere calculation (Jacobs, 2001). Despite this, 
many researchers and professionals have called for a more rules-based materiality standard 
(Bernstein, 1967; R. Elliott, 1981; Kranacher, 2007; Roberts & Dwyer, 1998; Rooij, 2009). A 
full consensus, however, has not been reached. 
Roberts and Dwyer (1998) suggest that judgement-based standards have caused “observed 
variation in materiality and risk judgements” (p. 575). Further, Roberts and Dwyer (1998) ask 
how the accounting profession can allow these standards to remain uncorrected, regarding a 
need for more rules-based guidance (p. 575). R. Elliott (1981), a then prominent member of 
the auditing community (Roberts & Dwyer, 1998), criticised the appropriateness of 
materiality guidance. R. Elliott (1981) suggested that a mechanical rule is put in place as this 
would allow users to see the precision of accounting statements. In a paper before R. Elliott 
(1981), Bernstein (1967) also recommended the use of definitive materiality standards to 
obtain uniformity in the accounting standards and therefore in judgements and opinions 
made. The study conducted by Dyer (1975) further highlighted the different materiality 
judgements of auditors’ which, among other things, was as a result of this judgement based 
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materiality standards. The call for uniform materiality standards is not limited to academic 
literature as Kranacher (2007) found that CPAs have consistantly been seeking proper 
definitions and examples of materiality judgements.  
In contrast, Moriarity and Barron (1979) argue against the use of rules based materiality 
standard. In their study, they found that there was a major disparity between the materiality 
judgements of audit firm partners. While this may indicate a call from auditors for a rules-
based approach, these same auditors would encounter issues with being able to find and agree 
on one binding rule. Sunder (2010) explains how the pursuit of writing uniform standards, 
which would promote uniform methods of materiality determination, would shut the door on 
learning by experience and would reduce the effectiveness of financial reporting.  Sunder 
(2010) goes on to suggest that to improve reporting we need to ensure a careful balance 
between judgement and rules, an idea that is evident in the current position of regulators in 
the standards they release.  
In response to the array of calls for uniform standards, the two regulators FASB and US SEC 
have issued their opinions on the matter (FASB, 1980; Levitt, 1998). The FASB (1980) have 
remarked that “no general standards of materiality could be formulated to take into account 
all the considerations that enter into an experienced human judgement” (p. 4). The SEC 
chairman at the time, Arthur Levitt, made the interesting point that due to our changing 
business environment, accountants and auditors need judgement to be able to keep up with 
the new transactions and events that occur as part of normal business progression (Levitt, 
1998). The SEC has taken a different approach and provided further materiality 
determination guidance (as opposed to mandates), as released in the staff bulletin No.99 
(SEC, 1999). This guidance is centred on the need for auditors to consider qualitative factors 
such as imprecise estimates, earnings trends, and regulatory compliance, among others in 
determining materiality.  
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Perhaps the best example of the war between the rules and judgement-based materiality 
standard is found in comments made nearly 75 years ago. Carman Blough (Blough, 1949) 
states that “the question of what is material has puzzled a great many people over a great 
many years, yet nobody is prepared to define it so that it does not ultimately rest on 
someone’s judgment” (P. 13). 
 
4.5 Disclosing Materiality 
The inclusion of additional audit report disclosures is based on both the new ISA 701 (ISA 
(NZ) 701, 2015), which requires the disclosure of Key Audit Matters, and the revised ISA 
700 (ISA (NZ) 700(Revised), 2015), which requires additional descriptive information on 
materiality. Specifically, how materiality applies to misstatements and therefore the audit 
opinion issued (Section 38(c)). Importantly, the standards do not specify that a materiality 
dollar value requires disclosue in the audit report. 
Despite this, there are several examples, both in New Zealand and overseas, which have 
adopted the requirement to disclose Key Audit Matters, along with voluntarily choosing to 
communicate the dollar value (i.e. threshold) of materiality (Contact Energy, 2017; Kiwi 
Property, 2017; Vodafone Group Plc, 2015; Z Energy, 2017). While others have chosen only 
to disclose the standard materiality definition and how it impacts misstatements (Fletcher 
Building, 2017; Sky City Entertainment Group, 2017), the public should expect the 
materiality threshold disclosure to align over the next few years.  
On this basis, the disclosure of materiality has begun in practice, and this is as a direct result 




4.6 Disparity Between Auditors in Determining Materiality 
Regardless of the position of a judgement based vs rules based materiality standard, there are 
significant implications and differences regarding how auditors determine materiality and 
how users determine and understand materiality. This discrepancy is a manifestation of the 
audit expectations gap which is one of the more thoroughly explored areas of auditing 
research. In fact, this is an area of auditing which is over one hundred years old (Houghton et 
al., 2011, p. 164). 
Chewning and Higgs (2002) provide a historical account of the development of materiality 
and more specifically, how auditors have formed materiality judgements. Chewning and 
Higgs (2002) conclude that there are considerable variances in the materiality judgements of 
auditors (p. 70). 
Friedberg, Strawser, and Cassidy (1989) executed an extensive study on the audit manuals of 
‘Big N’ audit firms. The empirical evidence suggested that the quantitative and qualitative 
guidance in the manuals differed significantly. This ultimately led to a significant disparity in 
the judgements between the ‘Big N’ audit firms. Martinov and Roebuck (1998), a similar 
study performed nearly ten years later, supported these findings. Iskandar and Iselin (1999) 
performed a major review of audit literature on materiality judgements which was separately 
revisited a decade later in a 2005 paper (W. Messier, Martinov-Bennie, & Eilifsen, 2005). 
These two reviews both concluded in support of a significant disparity between auditors’ 
materiality threshold judgements. Ward (1976) in his limited sample study (regarding 
geographic region and firm type), suggested that auditors show consensus in the factors that 
are essential to making materiality judgements. However, the relative importance of each 
factor was found to be very diverse. Pany and Wheeler (1989a) explored these factors by 
testing the sensitivity of five rules of thumb and found that in one industry, the largest 
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threshold was more than 18 times greater than the smallest threshold. Carpenter, Dirsmith, 
and Gupta (1994) suggest that the potential cause of this disparity between auditor judgement 
is related to the social constructs and experience in each member firm. In other words, the 
results suggest that firm culture and firm experience are primary factors in auditor materiality 
judgements. 
Moriarity and Barron (1979) conducted a study investigating the decision processes of audit 
firm partners, as opposed to the firm’s policies. They concluded that there was a lack of 
consensus and a major diversity between audit partner materiality judgements. This was 
supported by the slight variation identified in the similar study conducted by W. F. Messier 
(1983). However, it was ultimately suggested that there was a moderate colusion of 
judgement, indicating an overall lack of definitive consensus between audit partners’ 
materiality judgements. 
Azzopardi and Baldacchino (2009) explored audit judgements of both the ‘Big N’ and 
smaller audit firm materiality judgements. What they found was that while ‘Big N’ audit 
firms change materiality judgements with each client, smaller firms use a blanket percentage 
rate which is often unchanged (p. 22). The impact of this in terms of audit quality is profound 
and would be extremely concerning to regulators and users.  
Despite research suggesting a various disparity between the materiality judgements of 
auditors’, Waters and Tiller (1997) suggest that while a variance exists, it should not be 
abnormally large or small. Specifically, the materiality threshold would not be too significant 
as this would risk litigation and other costs that may arise from audit failure. Also, the 
materiality threshold would not be set too small as this would raise the cost of the audit. 
Waters and Tiller (1997) are ultimately suggesting that while a disparity exists, it is not 
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expected to be so large as to negatively affect the quality of the audit, as the risks and costs of 
doing so would be too great.  
 
4.7 Disparity Between Auditors and Users in Determining Materiality 
Porter (1993), in a leading paper on the audit expectations gap, defines the expectations gap 
as the difference between users’ perception of what an audit should perform and the users’ 
perceived level of auditors’ actual performance. This description is consistent with Monroe 
and Woodliff (1993) as stated in chapter 3.4. Specifically, the gap comprises of a limitation in 
the standards, and a difference between the duties of the auditor and the perceived duties. 
Firth (1979) investigated 150 individuals from different backgrounds to determine, in part, 
whether individuals would disclose ‘extraordinary’ items, based on losses and gains from the 
sale of business assets. His results suggest that accountants (auditors) have the lowest 
probability of disclosing extraordinary items. Further, it is identified that investment analysts 
and lenders have a much higher disclosure rate of these ‘extraordinary items’. If we consider 
investors and lenders as two of the most relevant user groups to listed company financial 
information (as is highlighted by Bamber and Stratton (1997) and Schneider and Church 
(2008)), the significance of this disclosure disparity between users and auditors is identified.  
In support of Firth (1979), Jennings, Kneer, and Reckers (1987) performed a study which 
compared auditors’ materiality judgements to that of users, financial analysts, lenders, and 
credit managers. The results suggest that the auditors’ materiality thresholds were higher than 
both credit managers and financial analysts, with bank lenders having the highest threshold. 
Ultimately, the result indicate that materiality judgements of auditors do not coincide with 
that of the user.  
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The use of non-empirical studies identify a similar trend in disparity. Gray et al. (2011), in 
their focus group discussions, found that assumptions about materiality levels differed wildly 
from user to user (p. 670). Also, some stakeholders regarded the disclosure of materiality to 
have inherent issues if the users do not understand the quantitative and qualitative factors that 
went into producing that number. Houghton et al. (2011) utilised face to face interviews with 
various stakeholders of financial services including lenders, analysts, auditors, and standard 
setters. The non-audit (user) groups supported the conclusions of Gray et al. (2011), 
suggesting that materiality is not very well understood.  
Holstrum and Messier (1982), a major paper summarising materiality research up to 1982, 
concluded that there are considerable differences between users and preparers of materiality. 
In general, users had lower materiality thresholds than auditors, with a larger gap between 
auditors from larger firms compared to smaller firms. In the similar study two decades later, 
W. Messier et al. (2005) reiterated the findings identified 20 years earlier.  Furthermore, 
another seminal study on previous materiality literature but focused specifically on 
materiality judgements, Iskandar and Iselin (1999), as discussed above, concluded that there 
is a lack of consensus between auditors and other user groups with regard to materiality 
perceptions.  
Pany and Wheeler (1989a) best summarise the issue of disparity between materiality 
judgements. In their comprehensive study of 330 companies in 25 diverse industries, they 







4.8 Disclosure of Materiality - Benefits 
Many researchers have been calling for the public disclosure of materiality (Chewning & 
Higgs, 2002; Davis, 2007; Doxey, 2013; M. Fisher, 1990; Waters & Tiller, 1997). Further, 
Houghton et al. (2011, p. 497) have evidenced a call from users for more action in general on 
materiality. In consideration of this, there are two opposing positions which identify both 
benefits and disadvantages of disclosing materiality, and ultimately the volume of research 
which aims to examine the issue is minimal. 
As considered, a significant benefit of the disclosure of materiality is that it can assist the 
audit expectations gap. Specifically, the disclosure of materiality can contribute by 
highlighting that an audit does provide assurance within a range, rather than providing 100 
percent assurance over the audited values (Houghton et al., 2011). This ultimately reflects the 
level of confidence that users can place in an audit (Davis, 2007). Gray et al. (2011) support 
this by finding that some stakeholders perceive the level of materiality and the level of 
assurance to be the same general concept. Litjens, Van Buuren, and Vergoosen (2013) are 
other proponents of the disclosure of materiality, suggesting that the audit expectations gap is 
reduced with additional information regarding materiality is disclosed.  
Davis (2007) and M. Fisher (1990) both use the disclosure of materiality in experimental 
market settings (refer to chapter 4.10 for further detail on these two studies). They both 
suggest that the disclosure of materiality can lead to more efficient markets. Further, Turner 
(2003, p. 16) suggests that the disclosure of materiality can aid the transparency of the 
financial statements and therefore their confidence and credibility.  
Davis (2007, p. 5) highlights how the disclosure of materiality may “prevent managers from 
intentionally recording errors within the boundaries of the auditor materiality threshold”, 
where the opposite is likely true. This form of earnings management is of paramount concern 
26 
 
to the SEC with the then Chairman, Arthur Levitt, dedicating his speech, ‘The Numbers 
Game’, (Levitt, 1998) to the issue of earnings management and how poorly the accounting 
profession has handled it. The SEC (1999) have gone further to suggest that the disclosure of 
materiality can aid the dissemination of information for equity users.  
 
4.9 Disclosure of Materiality - Disadvantages 
Gray et al. (2011, p. 677) identified that clients might use materiality threshold disclosures to 
source firms with high materiality levels as they know these audits will be cheaper. 
Additionally, the paper also recognises that disclosure may increase the risk of litigation, 
therefore pushing up audit fees as a whole (p. 678). Simunic and Stein (1996) support this 
suggestion through their review of empirical literature. Specifically, they identified that an 
increased risk of litigation would increase audit fees. 
Houghton, Jubb, Kend, and Ng (2010) found that stakeholders believe disclosing materiality 
will open numerous issues on how users perceive that information (p. 241). This is due to the 
severe lack of understanding that users have about materiality (p.218). Gray et al. (2011) 
support this claim in their similar and more recent study. Houghton et al. (2010) also 
considered that the audit report may not be fully read. Specifically, users typically only read 
the auditor’s opinion paragraph (p.252) which raises doubts on whether any additional 
disclosures would be read.  
R. Fisher (1993) explored the effects of changing from a long-form to short form audit report 
in New Zealand. Specifically, there was an effect where the long-form report was viewed as 
showing reduced auditor responsibility for the financial statements. As auditors are not 
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responsible for the preparation, it can be perceived as reducing the audit expectations gap and 
can indicate a better understanding of the audit process.  
While many of the studies above discuss the concept of the disclosure of materiality, very 
few conduct empirical research on the disclosure of materiality and its effects on user’s 
decisions and actions.  
 
4.10 Previous Research on the Disclosure of Materiality 
Davis (2007) uses experimental markets in a computerised session to investigate how the 
disclosure of materiality affects investors’ perceptions of the audit report and market 
behaviour. He used materiality set at the five percent, ten percent of asset value (“general 
rules of thumb”, p. 9) and no disclosure parameters. This is important as it detracts from the 
SEC (Levitt, 1998) statement that qualitative factors must also be used in determining 
materiality (while acknowledging that these rules of thumb could be argued as already 
including non-quantitative considerations). However, as concluded by Chewning and Higgs 
(2002), and supported by real audit data from Waters and Tiller (1997), these common rules 
of thumb are, and will continue to be, used by auditors. Davis (2007) provided participants 
with an auditor’s report and an analyst’s report (highlighting other financial information 
available in the capital markets). The results drawn reflect a reduction in the overconfidence 
of investors in the audit report. Further, the paper supports the call for further investigation 
into the mandated disclosure of materiality (p. 29).  
M. Fisher (1990), similar to Davis (2007), uses the disclosure of materiality in an 
experimental markets setting. However, M. Fisher (1990) explores the effect of the disclosure 
of materiality on security prices, trading volumes, and profits. Participants were given a 
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company ‘fact sheet’ (p. 193) consisting of projected and other earnings information, in 
addition to an audit report. Private (materiality) information is manipulated in the following 
three treatment effects: (1) no materiality threshold is disclosed, (2) materiality thresholds are 
disclosed to two people, and last (3) it was disclosed to everyone. This method was to test 
whether private disclosure of materiality can extrapolate to the rest of the experimental 
market. Similar to Davis (2007), five percent and ten percent thresholds (of earnings) were 
used. The results reflect that the nondisclosure of materiality led to mispricing of securities. 
Further, the disclosure of materiality assisted in the efficient operation of the experimental 
market with public disclosure having a greater effect on resolving efficiency than private 
disclosure. This result is consistent with Tuttle, Coller, and Plumlee (2002), who also used 
experimental markets to test the effect of undisclosed materiality on share prices. The results 
suggested that undisclosed misstatements below common materiality levels did not affect 
stock prices whereas undisclosed misstatements above common materiality levels did. 
Overall, M. Fisher (1990) supports the call for further investigation into the disclosure of 
materiality. 
Doxey (2013), a more recent paper, used two empirical experiments based on auditor 
disclosures. First, Doxey (2013) explores how auditor agreement with management estimates 
affects independence perceptions. Second, Doxey (2013) manipulated a question on user 
materiality perception, either before or after the public disclosure of materiality by the 
auditor. This was done to ascertain a possible anchor effect of user materiality perception. 
The results of the second experiment suggest that users anchor their materiality choice to that 
determined by auditors when they are presented with public disclosure before making a 
materiality assessment. In other words, if a materiality threshold were disclosed to financial 
statement users, they would form a similar materiality determination as auditors. Consistent 
with M. Fisher (1990) and Davis (2007), Doxey (2013) supports the call for further 
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materiality research. There were significant limitations evident in this study through apparent 
demand effects, where participants had knowledge that their decisions were based on 
materiality disclosure, along with small research samples. Further, these limitations may 
explain the lack of support for detecting investment decision effects with regard to 
materiality. 
Ruhnke et al. (2014), another working paper, explored the effect of how disclosing 
materiality levels and changing the profitability of an entity would affect credit lending 
decisions of senior bank executives in Berlin. Further, they explore the elasticity of lending 
decisions under different profitability scenarios. The results suggest that when materiality 
thresholds of auditors correspond with the executives, the lending decisions are not changed. 
However, when materiality is above user expected levels, the credit lending decision does 
change.  The major demand effects of this study are its significant limitation, similar to 
Doxey (2013). Specifically, Ruhnke et al. (2014) directly provided the three levels of 
materiality (within subject design) and subsequently asked the probability that the bank 
executive would grant the loan. Furthermore, materiality is set at three levels of materiality, 
five percent, 15 percent, and 25 percent of profit before tax. It can be considered that as 15 
and 25 percent are not common rules of thumb (i.e. not similar to the more common 
thresholds used in studies by Davis (2007) and Tuttle et al. (2002)), Ruhnke et al. (2014) are 
at risk of compiling unrealistic conclusions. Similar to the investment decision in Davis 
(2007), Ruhnke et al. (2014) concluded that the investment decision does not necessarily 
change with the disclosure of materiality. 
A recent 2015 study was conducted by Gutierrez et al. (2015) which investigated the costs of 
audit, audit quality, and investor reaction (regarding share price and trading) following the 
recent UK legislation which requires reporting of Key Audit Matters, including materiality 
determination. Gutierrez et al. (2015) identify that audit fees have increased by seven percent 
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for adopter entities for one-year post-adoption of the new standards. However, it was also 
suggested that an “increase in transparency in an audit report does not translate into better 
audit quality” (p. 26). Finally, the report does suggest that with smaller materiality thresholds 
disclosed, audit quality is increased. An important limitation is that this study only 
investigates one year of effects, with no long term considerations made.  
 
4.11 Summary 
New regulations support additional materiality disclosures as part of the wider Key Audit 
Matter reforms. Furthermore, market participants have taken charge with public materiality 
threshold disclosures for many New Zealand listed entities. Therefore, it is clear that 
additional academic research is required. Further, there are clear advantages and 
disadvantages to public disclosure, coupled with any change in auditor reporting having 
profound implications regarding the audit expectations gap. With these issues and a scant 
amount of prior research, further studies are desperately needed to explore what impact 
public materiality threshold disclosure will have on both the decisions of users and their 











5. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
As is evident from the literature review, there is a significant lack of prior research regarding 
the disclosure of materiality and how this may impact the decisions of users. Further, it is 
clear that market participants (listed company’s and auditors) are pressing ahead with auditor 
materiality threshold disclosure with little academic support on that potential impact. 
Therefore, this study will attempt to assess whether a change in non-professional investor 
decisions is possible, following a change in materiality threshold disclosure. 
 
Gray et al. (2011) suggest that materiality threshold disclosure and the level of assurance are 
intrinsically linked. There are two factors to this. First, users of audit reports will either view 
larger materiality thresholds as a result of the auditor perception of lower engagement risk 
and therefore a higher materiality is set for the lower required audit work. Alternatively, the 
higher materiality thresholds are interpreted by users as providing less assurance over the 
financial statements.  
 
The significant extent of audit expectations gap research (refer to chapter 4.7) suggests that 
the latter will be true and users are likely to perceive higher materiality threshold disclosure 
(compared to no or low materiality threshold disclosure) as providing less overall assurance. 
On this basis, it is expected that with higher materiality thresholds disclosed, the result would 
be a decrease in investment in the company. 
 
The research is built on the widely known neoclassical theory of the ‘rational investor’, 
relating to risk aversion and has been explored by numerous academics (Cohn, Lewellen, 
Lease, and Schlarbaum (1975); Felton, Gibson, & Sanbonmatsu, 2003; Morin & Suarez, 
1983). The overall idea is that with higher perceived risk, resulting from the increasing 
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materiality threshold disclosure (i.e. from no disclosure to disclosure and from a small 
threshold disclosure to a larger threshold disclosure), investors are expected to shift their 
holdings from higher perceived risk assets (in the case of this study, a hypothetical company), 
to less perceived risk assets (in the case of this study, NZ Government Bonds). Cohn et al. 
(1975) suggest that the participants should still invest in both (i.e. a combination). However, 
this combination should shift to the lower perceived risk asset with a higher perceived 
investment risk.  
From this, the first null (H10) and alternate (H1) hypothesis is derived: 
H10: An increase in the materiality threshold disclosure will not lead to a decrease in the 
proportion of investment in a hypothetical entity shares. 
H1: An increase in the materiality threshold disclosure will lead to a decrease in the 
proportion of investment in a hypothetical entity shares. 
 
Consistent with the first hypothesis (H1), the higher materiality threshold disclosure would 
cause investor perceptions to shift, where they would identify lower assurance being provided 
(by the auditor) over the financial statements. Therefore, with less assurance perceived by 
investors, the perception of audit quality should also reduce. This is founded on the basis that 
a reduction in assurance reduces the information value (i.e. increases information risk) of the 
audit opinion, and therefore the audit as a whole (Doxey, 2013). Further, audit quality has 
been identified as being linked, in part, to the ability of the auditor to detect misstatements 
(DeAngelo, 1981), whereby an increase in materiality will reduce this ability. 
On this basis, the second null (H20) and alternate (H2) hypothesis is derived: 




H2: An increase in the materiality threshold disclosure will decrease the perceived audit 
quality. 
 
From the development of these two null and alternate hypotheses, the research methodology 



























6. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH APPROACH 
6.1 Methodology 
This study adopts the mainstream approach, as described in Chua (1986). This reflects a 
realism ontology through which an independent reality exists, and absolute truth can be 
obtained from this reality. The research will follow a deductive approach and use positivism 
epistemology in obtaining the truth from the objective world. This approach is similar to 
Marcouldes and Heck (1993) and, as this research controls behaviour, as opposed to merely 
observing it, this methodology can be deemed appropriate.   
 
6.2 Sample Selection 
This study uses undergraduate students from the University of Canterbury, who are primarily 
studying commerce, as a proxy for non-professional investors. Using students (including 
using undergraduate students) as proxy investors have been conducted in various prior 
research, and those which specifically relate to audit reporting (e.g. Davis (2007) and M. 
Fisher (1990)).  
6.2.1 Using students as participants 
Using students as participants is appropriate due to this study targeting the non-professional 
investor group. Furthermore, as investors can vary in nature (such as large institutions, small 
banks and building societies, hobbyists, Mum’s and Dad’s (Tarrant, 2012), and students), for 
any investor decision research to be applied to the full population, a significantly large and 
diverse study would be required. This is a fruitful area for further research and one best suited 
to a larger sample study. However, and of significant consideration, as much as 34 percent of 
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share ownership (in the US) is held by ‘non-professional’ investors’ (Holt & DeZoort, 2009). 
As a consequence, this study can still be deemed to generalise its results to a reasonably large 
proportion of the investor population.  
Student surrogacy research has been conducted in the audit space with the principal papers, 
such as Ashton and Kramer (1980), suggesting that it may be appropriate given the ‘right’ 
conditions. These ‘right’ conditions are explored in the next subsection. In any case, the ease 
of access to undergraduate students is a major factor in the sample selection.  
 
6.2.2 Using undergraduate students as non-professional investors 
This study uses undergraduate students as non-professional investors. To ensure this is 
appropriate, this study has based the overall research design on the suggestions, albeit 
amended for undergraduate students, of W. B. Elliott, Hodge, Pronk, Jollineau, and Jane 
(2004). They posit that using graduate students is appropriate so long as researchers match 
the experimental design to the participant education and work experience level. This is 
explained in subsection 6.2.3. Despite this, the use of undergraduate students as a proxy for 
non-professional investors is a limitation as described in chapter two of this study, in line 
with research conducted by Abdel-Khalik (1974). 
 
6.2.3 Strategies used to improve the validity of using student surrogates 
Firstly, Hodge, Kennedy, and Maines (2004) (as supported by Frederickson and Miller 
(2004)) suggest that non-professional investors read information sequentially. Therefore, 
there was no manipulation of the order of information. Instead, all participants were given the 
company summary, income statement and balance sheet extracts, summary ratios, and audit 
36 
 
report extract in that same order (i.e. in the order they would often see these pieces of 
information in publically listed financial statements (Contact Energy, 2017; Z Energy, 
2017)). This also had the effect of avoiding confusion within the undergraduate students, 
where one may have had a different order of the experiment materials. 
Enis (1986) identifies that non-professional investors handle financial ratios better than other 
financial information (such as an income statement). Therefore, basic ratios, with benchmarks 
to the hypothetical industry, were incorporated at the end of the summary financial 
information (noting that non-professional investors read information sequentially). As a 
result, the better-understood information (i.e. financial ratios) is placed closer to the 
dependent variables, meaning more valuable and knowledgeable decisions are expected. 
Sun (2007) suggests that semi-professional investors better comprehend the understandability 
of annual reports, as compare to non-professional investors. This is primarily driven by the 
significant use of jargon in financial data and reports. On this basis, all experiment wording 
was carefully constructed to either be explained (i.e. defining shares and bonds) or simplified 
so that only plain English remained. 
Hofstedt (1972) determines that graduate students do not differ significantly to executives, 
regarding the understanding information, except in terms of the time required to process the 
information. This is supported by Arnold, Bedard, Phillips, and Sutton (2008), where they 
indicate that the use of analysis and management discussion is better understood by non-
professional investors, as opposed to executives. Therefore, while attending the 
undergraduate classes, students were advised that they had no time limit (however, 15 
minutes was an expected time based on preliminary test sampling). Furthermore, a brief 
background summary was provided, along with extract audit opinion, extract income 
statement and balance sheet, and financial ratios. On the one hand, this ensured excessive 
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time was not required and second, provided the type of extract and simple information best 
suited to non-professional investors.  
Pinsker (2007) investigated how undergraduate students value stock and one of the questions 
related to how ‘hard’ they deemed the study. From this, Pinsker (2007)  concluded that the 
undergraduate students did not find it overly ‘hard’, suggesting that financial information can 
be interpreted (with relative ease) by undergraduate students. This supports the use of 
undergraduate students as non-professional investors.  
Lastly, a key consideration is the experiment question which queried whether participants 
have either traded in shares (albeit only 14 percent noted that they had), or whether they had 
an intention to trade in shares or bonds over the next five years, where 78 percent of the 
participants indicated they did. This is significant as it shows that the participants were at 
least interested in making investment decisions over the short-medium term. Therefore, this 
suggests the participants were likely interested in the decision variable of the study. 
Further considerations of tailoring the research design to undergraduate students is discussed 
in the experiment design per chapter 6.3. Overall, a final sample of 49 participants was 









Summary of Participants 
 Control 5% Disclosure 10% Disclosure 
Total Participants 17 17 15 
Male 9 10 9 
Female 8 7 6 
Average Age 20-21 Years 20-21 Years 18-19 Years 
Average Accounting Courses 
Taken 
1-2 1-2 1-2 
 
6.2.3 Other sample considerations 
This study utilises a 3x1 experiment. Therefore, the most appropriate sample size would be 
roughly 45 participants – being 15 participants per experiment variable. The final sample 
obtained was 49 (with a minimum of 15 per cell) which supports the drawing of conclusions 
made. However, there is the likely impact of low statistical power due to the smaller sample 
size obtained. On this basis, the results will likely be conservative. The final sample excludes 
the three experiments which were discarded as they were not complete or due to 
inappropriate responses being recorded (i.e. two answers for one question). 
During the early planning and feasibility stage of this research, an attempt was made to use a 
lending decision, rather than investing – based on research by various other studies (Danos, 
Holt, & Imhoff Jr, 1989; Firth, 1980; Gul, 1987; Ruhnke et al., 2014). It was identified 
through phone and email conversations with three non-bank commercial lenders that they did 
not use audit reports when considering their lending decisions. This is an important insight as 
it suggests that the user base of financial information, including audit report users, may be 
more limited than first thought. It is also in contrast to the methods used in other studies (as 
above). However, with no responses obtained from the larger banking lenders, hence the 
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change to investing decisions, this conclusion has significant limitations. Further, with the 
current New Zealand materiality threshold disclosure only occurring in larger listed entities, 
which arguably would use large commercial banks for lending, it is entirely possible that 
these large banking lenders would require the use of audit reports. Therefore, it may still be 
valid to investigate changing auditor disclosure on these large bank lending decisions – as is 
noted for further research. 
 
6.3 Design of Experiment 
A critical paper on audit reporting highlights three links (refer to figure below) in relation to 
audit report research (Libby, 1979, p. 100). Link 1 is how users perceive the auditors 
intended message. Link 2 is the decision made from that perception and link 3 is the outcome 
of that decision. The research design has been constructed based on links one and two (how 
stakeholders perceive extract audited financial information and their investing decisions (i.e. 





Further studies would find it beneficial to explore the third link, researching the outcome of 
investor decisions as a result of materiality threshold disclosure. 
This experimental task involves an investment decision in either a hypothetical NZX listed 
entity (“NZ Building Suppliers Ltd”) or New Zealand Government bonds (or a combination 
of the two), where the manipulation of audit materiality threshold disclosure is hypothesised 
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(refer to chapter 5) to impact that decision. The various components of the experiment 
materials is explained as follows: 
6.3.1 Company background 
To ensure participants fully read and understood the company background, the research 
instrument began with a statement suggesting the participants spend ‘a few minutes’ to read 
it. This is founded on the idea of Hofstedt (1972), where so long as the students have 
sufficient time, they can appropriately understand the information. 
The NZ Government bonds were explained as being ‘risk-free’ but likely having lower 
returns on average than the shares in the hypothetical entity. It is also explained how capital 
gains and bond/dividend returns were ways in which to make money from the two 
investments. It is important to explain this to the non-professional investors (and the 
undergraduate students) to ensure the ‘jargon’ was appropriately removed or simplified (Sun, 
2007). Also, to acknowledge that the undergraduate students would most likely not know 
these concepts of investment returns well. The dividend policy and bond interest was 
provided to enable comparisons between the investments and was set at levels which ensured 
they were comparable. Despite this comparability, the hypothetical company was created to 
be slightly more attractive. This was done in an attempt to ensure the extract audit report, and 
related materiality threshold disclosure, is used in the decision (where the audit report is 
based on company financial information). 
Comments were added that the hypothetical entity had been audited by a large and registered 
audit firm. No reference was made to an audit firm name to ensure participants did not 
perceive a higher quality audit (where this could occur in the case of a ‘Big N’ audit opinion 
being issued (Mock et al., 2009)).  
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6.3.2 Financial information 
As described in chapter 6.2, participants were provided with a summary of the company 
background, extracts of the income statement and balance sheet, along with financial ratios. 
This is built on the study by Vergoossen (1993) who identifies what information is identified 
as important to investors, albeit professional investors. Specifically, for New Zealand 
investors it was identified that the income statement, balance sheet, and operation summaries 
(which could include ratios) are critical to investor decisions. 
The hypothetical company was made to appear plain, yet ‘positive’ (to ensure the audit report 
is appropriately considered). The entity was based on a large NZX listed entity and then 
adjusted based on various factors to remove any reference to the original entity. For instance, 
financial statement lines were amended to give generic narrations (selling and admin 
expenses, etc) and only extracts were provided. This was performed to increase the 
participants’ understandability of the information.  
The dollar values were reduced down to millions and rounded. This ensures participants were 
able to effectively analyse the data, without having to consider rounding or be impacted by 
‘large’ dollar values which the participants may perceive as being more positive. Percentage 
changes and basic (based on stage one university accounting studies) ratios were presented, 
on the basis, they are better understood by non-professional investors (Enis, 1986). 
Furthermore, pre-made percentage changes and ratios are provided to reduce the manual 
analysis required of students. This results in time-saving and ultimately ensures the analysis 
is performed correctly (i.e. ensures incorrect calculation will not impact the dependent 
variables). Benchmarking of ratios to fabricated industry averages reflects the hypothetic 
company as being slightly above (or at) the industry benchmark. As a result, the hypothetical 
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entity will be viewed by participants as plain and not significantly positive or negative which 
could distract participants (Estes & Reimer, 1979). 
Dollar values were amended in the income statement, and balance sheet extracts so that the 
movement was roughly a ten percent nominal improvement in 2017, compared to 2016. This 
ties into the narration provided where returns in the shares are partly derived from profit. 
Furthermore, this ten percent increase ties through to the highest materiality manipulation, 
meaning participants who are provided with a ten percent materiality threshold would 
identify negligible profit movements if a misstatement below the materiality threshold 
existed.  
 
6.3.3 Preliminary questions 
Four initial manipulation questions were raised to ensure participants had read the essential 
information. First, participants confirmed the profit result of the hypothetical entity which the 
materiality value is based. Second, participants confirmed the investment period of the shares 
and bonds to ensure they understood the investment period was identical (as it was assumed 
undergraduate students might view the share investment as a perpetuity). Third, participants 
confirmed the return possibilities from the two investments (which the ultimate investment 
decision is based) to ensure they understood how returns were derived. Lastly, participants 
confirmed the concept of risk in the two investments to ensure they understood this concept 
as part of their investment decision. This is important, as it is hypothesised that the concept of 





6.3.4 Audit report extract 
The audit reports were based on the latest audit report format of a large NZX listed entity. 
This was then reduced to an extract of the audit opinion, based on research which commonly 
suggests that extracted parts of the audit report are all that is read (Houghton et al., 2010; 
Mock et al., 2009). 
In addition to the standard audit report wording (based on pre Key Audit Matter Disclosures), 
a materiality definition (control) and threshold (for the five percent and ten percent threshold 
disclosures) were added. The materiality descriptive comments are based on the Auditing 
Standards (ISA (NZ) 320, 2011; ISA (NZ) 701, 2015). The materiality values shown are 
based on either no disclosure, a value based on five percent, or a value based on ten percent 
of net profit before tax in the hypothetical entity.  
Auditing standards (ISA (NZ) 320, 2011) suggest that the determination of materiality should 
also be based on qualitative factors and not just a benchmarked number. However, academic 
research suggests that quantitative ‘rules of thumb’ are commonly used by practitioners. 
Chewning Jr and Higgs (2000) performed a recent and major meta-analysis of materiality 
studies. They concluded that revenue, assets, and equity (i.e. quantitative) were main factors 
in auditors’ materiality judgements with working capital, earnings trends, firm size, current 
assets, and return on investment (i.e. qualitative factors) all having small effects on 
materiality judgements. Waters and Tiller (1997), which used real audit data, reiterates the 
conclusions found by Chewning Jr and Higgs (2000). Further, a later study by Chewning and 
Higgs (2002) suggests that the common rules of thumb are unlikely to be dropped. In 
addition, prior materiality research has also used the standard five percent and ten percent 
materiality benchmarks in their studies (Davis, 2007; Doxey, 2013; M. Fisher, 1990). On this 
basis, the use of five percent and ten percent materiality benchmarks appears reasonable.  
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6.3.5 Investment decision 
The investment decision is based on selecting a split of the investment value into either the 
risk-free NZ Government Bonds or the investment in the hypothetical company. The use of 
$1000 investment increments is added for simplicity, and the value of $7,000 was chosen 
based on the standard seven-point Likert scale, used throughout the study. The use of this 
investment split is constructed from the investment decisions employed by Doxey (2013), 
Lipe (1998), and Milne and Chan (1999). The participants were to invest their own money 
which ensures they consider their personal risk preference and to create a personal view of 
the investment (Milne & Chan, 1999). Further, participants were advised that they did have 
the $7,000 to invest which reduces the income differences between participants. 
 
6.3.6 Perceived audit quality 
To address audit quality, a question is asked regarding participants’ perceived reliability of 
the audited profit value in the hypothetical entity (i.e. the value that derives the materiality 
threshold). This is based on similar questions by Doxey (2013) and Hodge (2001), who elicit 
responses on the credibility of information and likelihood of misstatement. This question 
addresses how participants perceive audit quality as the reliability of audited values is a direct 
measure of reliability in the audit (i.e. if participants do not believe the audited values are 
reliable, this is due to their perception that the audit did not appropriately correct errors 
(DeAngelo, 1981)). The main advantage of this question is that it removes potential demand 
effects by not directly asking if participants believe the hypothetical auditor performed a 
quality job. The downside of not using additional questions on audit quality is the limited 
reliability checks that can be carried out (refer to chapter 7.1). 
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6.3.7 Other questions 
The level of risk associated with the investment decision is added as form of manipulation 
check. It is also a way to ensure reliability of the dependent investment decision variable (i.e. 
where a greater investment in the risk-free NZ Government bonds is chosen, a positive 
correlation is expected with the participant’s perceived level of risk in the NZ Building 
Suppliers Ltd). Furthermore, the use of the seven-point Likert scale to determine risk 
perceptions (seven-point Likert scales are used throughout the study) is based on the similar 
study by Charness, Gneezy, and Imas (2013), where they used a ten-point Likert scale to 
elicit risk preference. This study has used a seven-point scale to reduce the time participants 
spent in the experiement environment (i.e. to not make it overly burdensome), along with 
ensuring the reliability and validity of the results (Weber, Weber, & Nosić, 2012). 
The question on participants’ belief in being a financial risk-taker is a covariate for risk 
propensity of the investor. This is based on Charness et al. (2013) who suggests that 
questionnaires may be used to elicit risk preferences. 
Participants’ confidence in their previous decision’s is elicited and utilised to ensure the 
participant is happy with their answer. This can then be used to indicate reliability and 
validity of the responses (Hirst, Koonce, & Miller, 1999). 
The order of information preference is derived from Holt and DeZoort (2009) (who used a 
100 point scale) and is added to determine what information the participants based their 
investment decision. It is a form of validity check, where the low preference for audit opinion 
may indicate the quality of response – as the independent variable may not be effective at 
driving the dependent variable responses.  
46 
 
The question covering the materiality threshold is a direct manipulation check on the 
independent variable and has been added below the investing-based decisions to remove 
demand effects, which is noted as a limitation in the study done by Doxey (2013). 
The two questions which ask the auditor concern for material misstatement and the impact on 
the audit opinion as a result of identified misstatements, are a manipulation check on whether 
the participants grasp the concept of materiality. These are considered advanced for the 
undergraduate students. However positive responses would support the reliability and validity 
of the study.  
 
6.3.8 Demographic questions 
Various demographic questions assisted in eliciting differences in responses due to age, 
gender, and accounting history. 
Specific questions on experience with audit reports and financial information is provided as a 
covariate for the investment decision and the perception of audit quality (i.e. the two 
dependent variables). Additional questions on share trading history and intention to trade 
(based on a similar question by Hodge et al. (2004)) to elicit the interest that participants may 
have had in the study. 
 
6.4 Research Analysis 
Due to the quantitative nature of this study, statistical methods will be utilised first to 
examine the validity of the study and variables. This is based on Pearson’s R tests. Second, 
analysis of variances between the independent variable and the two dependent variables is 
used for the basis of hypotheses testing. This is based on the ANOVA technique. The 
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analysis will also incorporate relevant covariates (refer to chapter 6 for covariates identified) 
into the analysis using ANCOVA techniques.  
The statistical analysis translates the questions answered into numbers for analysis. For the 
investment decision question, the end-points are 1=$0 investment in shares and a $7000 
investment in bonds, 8=$7000 investment in shares and $0 investment in bonds. For the 
seven-point Likert scales used in the remaining questions, an answer of 1= negative 
connotation and an answer of 7=positive connotation (specific interpretation by question is 


















7.1 Study Validity 
This study has sourced the appropriate validity criteria from other quantitative investment 
decision-related studies, along with general statistical understanding of what is considered 
suitable for academic study. Where relevant, specific support for statistical benchmarks are 
provided. 
7.1.1 Manipulation validity 
With the use of undergraduate students as participants, this study has adopted an array of 
manipulation tests to ensure participants had read and understood the appropriate information 
(i.e. audit report extract, key financial themes, and the concept of risk). A summary of these 
key manipulation test results are as follows: 
Table 1 – Summary of key manipulation checks 








Correct  96% 76% 94% 84% 94% 
Incorrect 4% 24% 6% 16% 6% 
 
First, over 96 percent of the participants understood that the company was making a profit, 76 
percent understood the investment period was one year for each investment, and 84 percent 
understood how the investment returns were derived (being share dividends capital gains, and 
interest for the bonds). Further, 94 percent of participants understood the concept that shares 
in the hypothetical company will hold greater risk than the NZ Government Bonds (i.e. the 
bonds are considered risk free per the experiment summary – see Appendix). As this study is 
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founded on the rational investor theory, this is an important validity check which ensures this 
concept of risk is understood, prior to making the investment decision.  
In addition, 94 percent of participants answered the materiality question correctly, supporting 
the view that participants were actively aware of the materiality threshold disclosure when 
they made their investing decision. It is identified that 34 percent of participants identified the 
audit report in their top three pieces of information (where the five pieces are company 
background, income statement, balance sheet, financial ratios, and audit report). This does 
indicate a low to moderate use of this independent variable. However, 84 percent of 
participants identified the income statement in the top three. This suggests that participants 
did heavily rely on the statement, where this derives profit, and therefore the materiality 
threshold disclosed. 
This study also controlled for income variations between participants by stating they had the 
$7,000 available to invest, similar to Holt and DeZoort (2009) who control for income 
differences using a family member scenario. To ensure participants incorporate risk into their 
decision, the study specifically noted that they were to invest their own money.  
While any participant who scored one of these manipulation checks wrong could have been 
excluded from the study, this has only been done if at least two of the five tests were 
answered incorrectly. This has been deemed appropriate given the students are undergraduate 
(i.e. have limited technical understanding of the key concepts) and a mistake in two areas, but 
correct in the others, does not necessarily indicate that the participant has not fully grasped 
the fundamental concepts. This is supported by Holt and DeZoort (2009) who allow for one 
(of two) manipulation check to be answered incorrectly, yet the participant responses remain 
in the research analysis. 
Furthermore, being wrong in an area is entirely possible due to information not being fully 
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understood due to too much Jargon in the research materials Sun (2007). On this basis, the 
outcome of this approach was that only three samples were removed from the testing. 
It is concluded from the analysis that participants had likely understood the materiality 
threshold manipulation treatment (i.e. received the impact of the independent variables). 
 
7.1.2 Statistical validity 
This study has utilised Excel statistical functions, statistical calculators, and SPSS software to 
ensure appropriate, reliable statistical calculations. Scaling is used where relevant to ensure 
the eight-point investment decision Likert scale is comparable with the seven-point Likert 
scales used for the remaining questions. A minimum significance level of ten percent (p-
value < 0.1) is used throughout this study (and lower, where deemed relevant). This is 
appropriate given the sample sizes drawn. Despite this, the use of a ten percent significance 
level has also been used in prior research which assesses audit report disclosure and 
investment decisions (Gómez-Guillamón, 2003; Weber et al., 2012), albeit incorporating both 
five and ten percent significant levels at varying points. It would be appropriate for future 
studies, which refine the experiment materials, to use a lower significance level (such as p-
value < 0.05 or < 0.01). 
 
7.1.3 Construct validity and reliability 
Construct validity is founded in the significant prior research which has been the basis for the 
research design of both the experiment questions and the summary financial information 
(refer to chapter 6). Furthermore, the study utilised (and amended through extracts) a real 
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audit report and financial statement data (as adjusted from an NZX listed entity) to ensure 
undue bias was mitigated. 
Participants were not told the type of manipulation they were receiving. Further, the 
experiment materials were of similar length and formatting, and the experiment was 
conducted over a short period of time (four days). The different materiality threshold 
disclosures were not overly emphasised to avoid demand effects. While there lies a risk that 
participants may miss this key independent variable, the 94 percent correct response over 
materiality disclosure reduces any concern and supports internal reliability. 
To ensure this study was appropriately concise, ensuring undergraduate students had enough 
time to complete and comprehend the experiment, the research design has forfeited some 
validity (reliability) questions – i.e. different questions (minimum of three) tapping the same 
key theme, which can be statistically analysed using methods such as Cronbach’s Alpha. 
Instead, this study has adopted inversely related validity checks where the use of Pearson’s R 
bivariate tests can be used to determine construct validity. Bivariate tests are deemed 
appropriate given the two variable testing performed. ANOVA tests over participants’ 
confidence in the study have also been utilised. 
There are four key validity checks which have been performed over the two hypotheses (H1 
and H2) and then over the concept of perceived investment risk, which ties the two together. 
























5.29 1.45 5.82 1.29 3.47 1.31 
Perceived Audit 
Quality 
5.18 1.38 5.29 0.82 5.07 1.18 
Perceived Risk 4.53 0.98 3.47 1.14 3.80 0.91 
Financial Risk-
Taker Disposition 
4.12 1.18 4.76 0.88 3.87 1.67 
Decision 
Confidence 









3.12 1.45 2.88 1.13 2.47 1.36 
Notes: 
Investment decision end points, 1=$0 shares & $7,000 bonds, 8=$7,000 shares & $1,000 bonds.  
Perceived audit quality end points, 1=very unreliable, 7=very reliable. 
Perceived risk endpoints, 1=very low risk, 7=very high risk 
Financial risk-taker disposition, 1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree 
Decision confidence end points, 1=no confidence, 7=very confident 
 
7.1.3.1 Investment decision 
The dependent variable relating to the investment decision (H1) is expected to be closely and 
inversely related to investment risk – i.e. with a larger investment decision response (greater 
investment in shares), I would expect a lower perceived risk of the investment. This would 
hold true for each of the independent variables, as irrespective of the ultimate investment 
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decision, this should correspond to a linear impact on the perceived risk of the investment. To 
test for this, a bivariate Pearson’s R test is used, using descriptive statistics per Table 2: 
Table 3 – Pearson’s R test between investment decision and perceived investment risk 
    R-value  
Control 0.140 ** 
5% Disclosure -0.182 *** 
10% Disclosure -0.649  
Notes: 
*, **, *** indicate significance (one tailed t-test) at 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels.  
 
 
From the analysis in table 3, the independent control variable exhibits a significant (p-value < 
0.05) positive correlation, indicating that perceived risk of the investment did not drive the 
investment decision, as was expected. 
However, the five percent disclosure evidenced a minor significant (p-value < 0.01) negative 
correlation and the ten percent disclosure indicated a lack of statistical significance.  
Overall, it is not clear whether the perceived risk of the investment drove the investment 
decision, limiting the conclusions that can be drawn. Further analysis is performed below.  
It is expected that with a higher investment in shares, the participant would identify 
themselves as being less risk averse (on the basis that if the participant were risk averse, they 
would switch their investment away from the shares and into the risk-free NZ Government 
Bonds, all else equal). Therefore, it is expected that a positive relationship between the 
investment decision and level of risk-taker disposition would result. To test this, a bivariate 





Table 4 – Pearson’s R test between investment decision and risk-taker disposition 
  R-value  
Control 0.496 *** 
5% Disclosure 0.223 *** 
10% Disclosure 0.029  
Notes: 
*, **, *** indicate significance (one tailed t-test) at 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels.  
 
 
As can be seen, there is a significant (p-value < 0.01) low to moderate positive relationship in 
the control and five percent independent variables. However, an insignificant result when the 
materiality threshold disclosure is ten percent of net profit before tax. Importantly, this 
provides support for the reliability of the study given the significant results identified for the 
control and five percent materiality threshold disclosure. 
 
7.1.3.2 Perceived audit quality 
The dependent variable (H2) relating to audit quality is expected to be closely and inversely 
related to the question on investment risk – i.e. with a greater perceived investment risk, the 
quality of the audited values is expected to decrease. This is consistent with arguments made 
as part of the hypotheses development (refer to chapter 5). Further, where participants 
identify the audited values as unreliable, the investment decision risk should increase. A 






Table 5 – Pearson’s R test between audit quality and perceived investment risk 
  R-value  
Control 0.192 * 
5% Disclosure -0.522 *** 
10% Disclosure -0.484 *** 
Notes: 
*, **, *** indicate significance (one tailed t-test) at 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels.  
 
 
From table 5, there is a significant and moderate negative correlation for all three variables 
stated. Therefore, when investment risk is perceived to be high, this correlates with a low 
perception of audit quality. This result is expected and due to the statistical significance, 
supports the reliability of the study. 
 
7.1.3.3 Investment decision and perceived audit quality 
Based on the two hypotheses formulated (H1 & H2) per chapter 5, I would expect that the 
two dependent variables would move in a positive relationship (i.e. a higher investment in 
shares of the hypothetical entity would also result in a higher perceived audit quality). To test 
for this, a bivariate Pearson’s R test is used using descriptive statistics per Table 2: 
Table 6 – Pearson’s R test between investment decision and perceived audit quality 
  R-value  
Control -0.232  
5% Disclosure 0.049 * 
10% Disclosure 0.368 *** 
Notes: 
*, **, *** indicate significance (one tailed t-test) at 10 





Table 6 identifies that it is statistically significant that a low to moderate positive relationship 
exists for the five (p-value < 0.1) and ten percent (p-value < 0.01) materiality disclosures, 
when correlating the investment decision with the perceived audit quality. Further, there is 
not a statistically significant correlation for the control disclosure. This therefore supports the 
reliability of this study.  
 
7.1.3.4 Financial risk-taker 
To ensure that investment risk is appropriately considered in the four tests above, a separate 
bivariate Pearson’s R test has been completed over the belief that the participant is a financial 
risk-taker and the perceived risk in the investment. The general belief is that where the 
participant identifies as a high financial risk-taker, they are more likely to perceive a lower 
risk in the investment in shares, over the risk-free NZ Government Bonds. To test for this, a 
bivariate Pearson’s R test is used using descriptive statistics per Table 2: 
Table 7 – Pearson’s R test between risk-taker disposition and perceived investment risk 
  R-value  
Control 0.099  
5% Disclosure -0.300 *** 
10% Disclosure 0.150  
Notes: 
*, **, *** indicate significance (one tailed t-test) at 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels.  
 
 
From table 7, there is an insignificant correlation for the control and ten percent independent 
variables. However, a significant (p-value < 0.01) and moderate inverse relationship in the 
five percent disclosure which is consistent expectations. On this basis, it is somewhat likely 
that the concept of risk was understood by participants.  
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7.1.3.5 Summary of Pearson’s R tests 
Overall it can be summarised that the Pearson’s R tests support the reliability of this study 
and therefore provide comfort over the subsequent conclusions drawn and generalisations 
made (refer chapter 8). However, there are a few correlations identified above which are not 
inline with what is expected and this does provide some limitation.  
Future studies would benefit from larger sample sizes or additional experiment questions 
tailored around a similar concept. This would enable greater analysis to be performed, along 
with alternate statistics used such as Cronbach’s Alpha. 
 
7.1.3.6 Confidence level 
Experiment reliability is also driven by the confidence level that participants place in the 
study. This is based on the study by Hirst et al. (1999). 
As can be seen from the descriptive statistics per Table 2, the mean confidence level in the 
decision was greater than ‘neutral’ and towards ‘somewhat confident’ for the control and ten 
percent disclosure. For those who answered the five percent disclosure, this was a strong 
‘somewhat confident’ mean response. This low to medium response is expected of 
undergraduate students, given their more limited understanding of investing in general. Using 
ANOVA analysis over the mean difference between groups (in relation to perceived 
confidence level), the F-Score is 2.773 and the confidence level P=0.073 is derived. 
Importantly, this is within the ten percent benchmark for significance. On this basis, the 
results suggest that participants were generally on the side of ‘somewhat confident’ in their 
decision which supports the internal reliability. Of particular mention, is that this question 
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covers the investment decision (H1) and not the perception of audit quality (H2), limiting the 
scope of this question. 
 
7.1.3.6 Conclusion – construct validity and reliability 
Overall, it can be concluded that the study has sufficient construct validity and reliability. 
Furthermore, 78 percent of participants indicated that they had an intention to purchase shares 
in the future. Therefore, it can be assumed that the participants were interested in the study 
(in terms of the investing decision). Further, with only 14 percent of participants indicating 
they had purchased shares previously, the insignificant Pearson’s R results in some categories 
are somewhat expected.  
 
7.2 Investment Decision 
This research has utilised both a univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test the H1 
hypothesis, along with bivariate t-tests to examine differences between the mean scores of 
each group. 
To reject the null hypothesis relating to the investment decision, an ANOVA statistical test 
has been used in line with the descriptive statistics provided in Table 2. From this, an F-score 
of 12.998 with a P=0.000 is derived suggesting significant differences (within p-value < 0.1) 
between groups. This suggests the rejection of the null hypothesis, where an increase in 
materiality threshold disclosure relates to a corresponding decrease in the investment in the 
hypothetical company.  
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To further break down the impact, and to determine the extent to which the null hypothesis 
(H1) can be rejected, additional bivariate t-tests have been performed – see table 8.  
 
Table 8 - T-test (p-value < 0.1) of differences in groups investment – H1 (bold is not-
significant at p-value) 
Groups T-value P-value 
Control – 5% Disclosure -1.091 0.283 
Control – 10% Disclosure 3.610 0.001 
5% Disclosure – 10% Disclosure 4.950 0.00002 
 
As shown in table 8, there is a significant difference in the mean for the control variable and 
the ten percent materiality threshold disclosure, along with the five percent and ten percent 
materiality threshold disclosure groups. Alternatively, there is no significant differences in 
means between groups for the control and five percent materiality threshold disclosure. 
Therefore, the results suggest a partial rejection the null hypothesis (H10), based on the ten 
percent materiality, and not the five percent, materiality threshold disclosure. 
In an un-tabulated one-way ANCOVA for two independent means, audit report experience is 
used as a covariate for the control and five percent materiality threshold disclosure to 
determine whether this impacts the investment decision. This is based on the descriptive 
statistics provided in Table 2. From the analysis performed, when controlling for participants’ 
audit report experience, there remains no mean difference between groups relating to 
investment decision when a five percent materiality threshold is disclosed, due to statistical 
insignificance (F-value=1.22, p-value=0.277). This effect is consistent when financial 
statement experience is used as a covariate (F-value=1.38, p-value=0.249). 
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7.3 Perceived Audit Quality 
This research has utilised both a univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test the H2 
hypothesis, along with bivariate t-tests to examine differences between the mean scores of 
each group. 
In order to test the null hypothesis (H20) relating to the perception of audit risk, an ANOVA 
statistical test has been used in line with the descriptive statistics provided in Table 2. The 
ANOVA test F-score is 0.146 and P=.864. On this basis, the results suggest the failure to 
reject the null hypothesis which suggests that increasing auditor materiality threshold 
disclosure does not lead to a decrease in perceived audit quality. 
The t-tests performed over this tells a similar story (as is expected given the ANOVA result) 
when considering a bivariate analysis over each of the different independent variables: 
Table 9 - T-test (p-value < 0.1) of differences between groups perceived audit quality – H2 
(bold is not-significant at p-value) 
Groups T-value P-value 
Control – 5% Disclosure -0.293 0.772 
Control – 10% Disclosure 0.232 0.818 
5% Disclosure – 10% Disclosure 0.617 0.542 
 
In an un-tabulated one-way ANCOVA for three independent means, audit report experience 
is used as a covariate for materiality threshold disclosure and perception of audit quality. This 
is based on the descriptive statistics provided in Table 2. From the analysis performed, when 
controlling for participants’ audit report experience, there remains no mean difference 
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between groups relating to materiality threshold disclosure and the perceived audit quality, 
due to statistical insignificance (F-value=0.15, p-value=0.861).  This effect is consistent when 
financial statement experience is used as a covariate (F-value=0.12, p-value=0.887). 
Therefore, the results fail to reject the null hypothesis (H20), consistent with the ANOVA 
analysis.  
Consideration are also given to using a MANOVA test analysis based on the relationship 
between perceived audit quality and the investment decision. However, with the statistically 
insignificant finding over perceived audit quality, this test would be somewhat redundant and 
has not been considered further. 
 
7.4 Summary of Findings 
From the statistical analysis performed, there are significant mean differences between the 
control and ten percent materiality threshold disclosure, and between the five percent and ten 
percent materiality threshold disclosure groups. This enables a partial rejection of the null 
hypothesis (H10). On this basis, there is statistically significant evidence that a materiality 
threshold disclosure of ten percent will result in a shift in investment from the relatively 
higher risk shares and into risk-free NZ Government Bonds. While the validity tests do 
suggest an element of caution in interpreting the findings, the result is significant and can be 
used to generalise to the population.  
In contrast, no significant evidence of an impact is identified for the effect of materiality 
threshold disclosure and perceptions of audit quality consequently, the results completely fail 
to reject the null hypothesis (H20). On this basis, there is no statistical evidence to suggest 





8.1 Purpose  
The purpose of this study is to determine whether an increase in materiality threshold 
disclosure would decrease first, the level of investment in a hypothetical entity (H1) and 
second, the perceived audit quality (H2).  
The discussion of the statistical results performed has been split based on these two 
hypotheses. 
 
8.2 Investment Decision 
8.2.1 Overall results 
From the analysis performed, it is possible to partially reject the null hypothesis (H1). It is 
identified that from the five percent and ten percent materiality threshold disclosures, the only 
significant effect identified (at a significant p-value < 0.001) is when the materiality threshold 
is ten percent of net profit before tax. Due to this mean significant difference between groups, 
when the materiality threshold is disclosed at ten percent of profit before tax, investment in 
the hypothetical entity will reduce, in favour of an increased investment in risk-free NZ 
Government Bonds. This occurs when the means between groups are compared to the no 
disclosure and five percent threshold disclosure groups. Further, the Pearson’s R tests 
performed (refer to chapter 7.1.3.4) indicate that this is low-moderately likely due to the 
perceived higher risk in the share investment. 
Conversely, this research identifies that with a five percent materiality threshold disclosure, 
there is no change between groups in the mean investment in shares in the hypothetical 
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company, in favour of risk-free NZ Government Bonds. This is due to lack of statistical 
significance (at p-value < 0.1). When financial statement audit report experience are 
incorporated as covariates, this statistical insignificance remains (at p-value < 0.1).  
This result is consistent with other studies, where statistically significant changes in 
behaviour, as a result of a ten percent materiality disclosure, are identified (Davis, 2007; 
Doxey, 2013; Ruhnke et al., 2014). However, in contrast to these studies, this research 
identifies a lack of statistical significance when the materiality threshold disclosure is five 
percent of net profit before tax.  
 
8.2.2 Five percent materiality threshold disclosure 
One possible reason for the absence in statistical significance at the five percent threshold 
disclosure is that participants may have misunderstood the concept of materiality. However, 
this appears unlikely from the manipulation testing performed (refer chapter 7.1). Further, the 
research experiment included two control variables to test user’s understanding of materiality, 
and how this would impact an audit report. First, the experiment asked what type of 
misstatements auditors are concerned with (82 percent answered this correctly) and second, 
participants were asked what impact a material misstatement would have on the audit report 
(65 percent answered this correctly). The question relating to misstatements was answered 
correctly by the majority of participants. Further, the second question regarding 
misstatements and its impact on audit reporting was answered moderately correctly. Due to 
these results, the level of understanding by these undergraduate studies is considered 
reasonably high, indicating the participants had likely understood the concept of materiality.  
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The level of understanding of materiality (by the participants) is not consistent with the 
qualitative based studies of Houghton et al. (2011) and Gray et al. (2011). Through face to 
face interviews, Houghton et al. (2011) (and supported by Gray et al. (2011)) identify that 
different financial statement user groups perceive problems with understanding materiality. 
However, this research suggests that this may not be the case, with the questions on 
materiality, and its impact on audit reporting, being answered correctly by a large proportion 
of the participants. Future studies would benefit from exploring this finding further, along 
with deriving more statistical significance from the results. 
Another possible reason for the lack of statistical significance at the five percent threshold 
disclosure, in line with the investor risk theory, is that the participants did not identify the 
materiality threshold disclosure as increasing risk. In other words, participants do not 
perceive that a five percent materiality threshold disclosure is material, meaning the mean 
investment did not change (due to lack of statistical significance). Importantly, this suggests 
that the materiality threshold perceptions of the participants (proxies for non-professional 
investors) are aligned, and therefore the audit expectations gap is not negatively impacted. 
The lack of statistical significance limits these conclusions drawn. 
 
8.2.3 Ten percent materiality threshold disclosure 
It is likely that the ten percent materiality disclosure did not conform to the expectations of 
participants, where they identified the ten percent threshold disclosure as being material. Due 
to this, greater risk is perceived, and the investment in shares shifted to the risk-free NZ 
Government Bonds. This is consistent with the findings by Doxey (2013) who argues that the 
decisions of users and auditors (regarding materiality) do not match well. Further, this 
indicates that participants are penalising the hypothetical company through less investment, 
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as a result of a ten percent materiality threshold disclosure. On this basis, this supports the 
existence of the audit expectations gap (Porter, 1993). Further, this finding supports other 
research which suggests that auditor materiality threshold judgements are higher than that of 
financial statement users (Firth, 1979; Jennings et al., 1987).  
Auditors will utilise higher materiality thresholds when their risk assessment of an entity 
identifies a lower potential for a risk of material misstatement. This is consistent with the 
auditing standards which identify audit risk as being a function of misstatement (ISA (NZ) 
320, 2011-Section A1). On this basis, with lower audit risk, the auditor will identify a lower 
risk of misstatement and the resulting materiality will increase (as less audit work is required 
to reduce this perceived lower risk to an acceptably low level). The results of this study 
suggest that participants do not agree with this assessment when the materiality threshold is 
disclosed at ten percent (due to the shift in investment into risk-free NZ Government Bonds). 
On this basis, the results further support the existence of the audit expectation gap. 
Additionally, the results suggest that including materiality threshold disclosure at ten percent 
of net profit before tax will increase the audit expectations gap. This finding is inconsistent 
with other research which supports materiality disclosure (Litjens et al., 2013). 
It is acknowledged that the statistically significant reduction in investment in shares, as a 
result of the ten percent materiality threshold disclosure,  may also be explained by other 
factors which are not directly tested within this study (as described in chapter 6.2, this was to 
reduce the information overload on the undergraduate students). For instance, it is possible 
that the additional disclosures are seen by participants as auditors passing on their 
responsibility (similar to impacts identified by R. Fisher (1993)). Therefore, added 
investment risk is identified by the participants which leads to a reduction share investment, 
in favour of risk-free NZ Government Bonds. However, this may be unlikely due to the 
failure to reject the H20 null hypothesis. On this basis, it is likely that the participants do not 
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blame the auditor for materiality threshold disclosure (i.e. do not identify that auditors are 
passing on their responsibility), in contrast to the findings of R. Fisher (1993). However, due 
to lack of statistical significance, these findings are limited. 
Appropriately functioning capital markets rely on having sufficient and up to date 
information. Due to the results of this study, it is likely that materiality threshold disclosures 
should form part of this information (on the basis that investment decisions did change as a 
result of a ten percent materiality disclosure). This is consistent with the findings of M. Fisher 
(1990). As suggested, participants may not agree with the ten percent materiality threshold 
and hence this creates an expectations gap between participants and auditors. However as the 
purpose of an audit is to “enhance the degree of confidence of intended users…” (ISA (NZ) 
200, 2016, p. 6), and as users within this study (i.e. non-professional proxy investors) are 
indicating they do not agree with the ten percent threshold disclosure, then it may be useful to 
disclose materiality. This is on the basis that if materiality were disclosed, this might force 
auditors to realign their materiality judgements in line with user’s expectations, therefore 
reducing the audit expectations gap. Alternatively, no disclosure will likely have no impact 
on how auditors determine materiality and as such, create no change to the audit expectations 
gap which has been shown to exist when materiality thresholds are ten percent of profit 
before tax. 
Furthermore, it is possible that when materiality threshold disclosure occurs, financial 
statement users will anchor their materiality perceptions of the first adopters, onto subsequent 
adopters. This is the anchoring effect identified by Doxey (2013). Specifically, the first 
companies who disclose materiality thresholds may exhibit a reduction in trading of their 
shares (where a ten percent materiality threshold is used). However, investors are likely to 
anchor their materiality threshold disclosure to these first adopters and apply it to subsequent 
67 
 
adopters. This would then lead to a minimal impact on share trading in the long run (as the 
materiality perceptions of financial statement users’ and auditors’ are now aligned). 
 
8.2.4 Summary 
The results of the statistically significant, ten percent materiality threshold disclosure, are 
important for the investing community and capital markets. When materiality thresholds are 
disclosed at ten percent of profit before tax, non-professional investors (which can be as 
much as 34 percent of the capital market (Holt & DeZoort, 2009)) are reducing their 
investment in shares, in favour of risk free NZ Government Bonds. This may have severe 
(albeit likely short-term) impacts on companies who rely on capital markets for future 
funding (such as start-ups or mature entities wishing to expand). In contrast, this may benefit 
Governments through increasing demand for their bonds. 
Overall, while it is identified that initial investment decision impacts occur in the short-term 
(effectively, immediately), it is possible that the long run implications would be minimal (due 
to an anchoring effect). Therefore, the disclosure of materiality thresholds may be beneficial, 
on the basis that the disclosure of materiality thresholds may ensure materiality is more 
aligned between users of financial statements and auditors (reducing the audit expectations 
gap). It is on this basis that the disclosure of materiality is tentatively supported from the 
results of this study. However, further longitudinal studies required to verify the long run 
impacts of disclosure (on the audit expectations gap). 
This tentative call for disclosure is important, given the companies and auditors already 
disclosing materiality thresholds in New Zealand (Contact Energy, 2017; Vodafone Group 
Plc, 2015; Z Energy, 2017). Further, it is consistent with the growing array of research which 
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also calls for the public disclosure of materiality (Davis, 2007; Houghton et al., 2011; Litjens 
et al., 2013). 
To increase the statistical significance of the five percent disclosure, future studies should 
increase the participant sample size and potentially the types of participants (i.e. more 
advanced proxies for non-professional investors, such as MBA students). Further, the results 
within the research reliability testing performed (refer to chapter 7.1), where statistically 
significance was not identified in all instances, does limit the conclusions drawn. 
 
8.3 Perceived Audit Quality 
From the analysis conducted, this study fully rejects the null hypothesis (H2). The change in 
materiality threshold disclosure (at five and ten percent of net profit before tax) does not 
significantly (p-value < 0.1) change the perceived audit quality. This statistical insignificance 
remains when financial statement and audit report experience are incorporated as covariates. 
The lack of significant impact on this variable was unexpected given the significant finding 
over investment decision and due to the moderately positive Pearson’s R test performed over 
these two dependent variables (refer to chapter 7.1). 
Consistent with chapter 8.2, it is identified that the participants have a moderate to strong 
understanding of materiality. As such, it is possible that the lack of mean difference between 
groups (due to lack of statistical significance) is caused by participants perceiving materiality 
choice as a regular part of the audit process, along with the fact that participants may not 
blame the auditors for the materiality disclosure. In other words, this could indicate that 
participants do not see their requirements as driving materiality, rather it is an auditor 
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decision, based on auditor requirements. This is in contrast with auditing standards (ISA (NZ) 
320, 2011) and indicates a separate type of audit expectations gap issue. 
Importantly, the lack of mean differences between groups (due to lack of statistical 
significance) is in contrast to previous studies. These studies suggest that stakeholders 
perceive materiality and assurance to be the same concept (Gray et al., 2011), along with 
materiality reflecting the confidence (i.e. quality) that can be placed in audit (Davis, 2007). 
Further, the results are in contrast to Gutierrez et al. (2015) who identifies that materiality 
threshold disclosure can positively impact audit quality. However, without statistical 
significance it is plausible that these studies are still valid. 
Alternatively, the audit quality experiment question was posed in an indirect way (i.e. the 
question posed the reliability of the audited financial information, rather than the specific 
quality of the audit). On this basis, it is entirely possible that the participants simply read the 
unmodified audit opinion wording and did not pay particular attention to the impact of 
materiality – and hence no significant change in perceived audit quality was identified. This 
finding would also be consistent with Mock et al. (2009) who suggest that most audit report 
users simply identify whether the report is qualified, along with Gray et al. (2011) who 
identify that users would be happy with a stamp, rather than the boilerplate wording which is 
currently in use. 
Future studies would benefit from larger samples sizes, along with including additional 







The aim of this research has been to investigate how the change in materiality threshold 
disclosure will impact on the investing decisions of non-professional investors, along with 
their related perceptions of audit quality. The first hypothesis (H1) suggests that with higher 
materiality thresholds disclosed, investors will perceive the investment as higher risk and 
therefore reduce their investment in shares, in favour of risk-free NZ Government Bonds. 
Consistent with this, the second hypothesis (H2) suggests that with higher auditor materiality 
thresholds disclosed, non-professional investors will perceive this as being consistent with 
lower audit quality. 
First, the univariate and bivariate testing performed identifies that with a ten percent 
materiality threshold disclosure, the mean investment in the hypothetical entity will shift to 
lower risk NZ Government Bonds. This has serious implications for the market at large, 
suggesting that the materiality perceptions of non-professional investors and auditors have 
significant differences (i.e. supporting the evidence for an audit expectations gap (Porter, 
1993)).  
From prior research, it has been identified that it is likely that financial statement users will 
anchor future materiality threshold disclosures by later adopters, with those companies that 
have adopted early (whether by choice or regulation). On this basis, it is expected that long 
run materiality perceptions of both users of financial statements and auditors may align (i.e. 
the audit expectations gap may reduce (Doxey, 2013)). 
Second, this study identifies no significant mean difference between the groups for when the 
materiality threshold is disclosed at five percent of profit before tax. It is suggested that this 
lack of mean difference (due to lack of statistical significance) may be due to participants not 
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perceiving the five percent materiality threshold as material. Therefore, this suggests the lack 
of an audit expectations gap, however due to lack of statistical significance, this finding is 
limited.  
Third, the univariate testing performed identified that there is no statistically significant mean 
difference between the level of materiality disclosed and the perception of audit quality. 
While it is likely that this could be driven by the limitations in research sample size and 
reliability, it is possible that participants simply identified materiality as a normal part of the 
audit process, and did not align the different materiality thresholds with different levels of 
assurance provided. 
Finally, this research identifies the existence of the audit expectations gap when materiality 
thresholds are disclosed at ten percent of net profit before tax. This may result in a decision 
against the public disclosure of materiality thresholds. However, it is possible that with 
materiality threshold disclosure, auditors will identify that non-professional investors 
disagree with their materiality assessment (as they switch their investment from shares and 
into more risk-free assets). From this, and over time, auditors may better align their 
materiality thresholds with the perceptions of financial statement users. Alternatively, it is 
possible these perceptions of users may naturally align over time due to the anchoring effect 
Doxey (2013). 
The disclosure of materiality thresholds may also have other positive benefits. For instance, 
the disclosure of materiality may help users of financial information make more appropriate 
comparisons between entities. This is supported by Firth (1979) and W. Messier et al. (2005) 
who suggest that meaningful comparisons cannot be made within and between companies 
without knowledge of the degree of misstatement.  
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Therefore, this research tentatively supports the disclosure of materiality thresholds in audit 
reports. However, before materiality thresholds are recommended to be disclosed, future 
studies are required to determine whether the long-term benefits of materiality disclosure (as 




















10.  CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
The findings of this study contribute to the limited, yet growing, research in the space of audit 
materiality disclosure and its impact on financial statement user decisions. Due to limited 
prior research, this study provides new insights and contributions to the impacts that audit 
materiality threshold disclosure will have on the decisions of non-professional investors. 
Specifically, that large (ten percent) materiality threshold disclosures will cause non-
professional investors to reduce their investment in shares, in favour of risk-free investing 
instruments. Further, identifying that there is no mean difference in the investment decision 
where a small (five percent) materiality threshold disclosure is used, due to lack of statistical 
significance. In addition, this study has identified that non-professional investors perceive no 
mean difference in the perceived level of audit quality, also due to lack of statistical 
significance.  
This research provides important insights into the continuing audit expectations gap debate 
and provides a solid foundation to drive future research on the disclosure of materiality 
thresholds and its impact on financial statement users. Furthermore, this study provides 
tentative support for auditor materiality threshold disclosure, however further longitudinal 
studies are needed. 
Additionally, the preliminary focus of this research identified that not all lenders consider the 
audit report as part of their lending decisions. This can have far-reaching consequences 
regarding who the users of audit reports are and the information value they contain. Further 





11. FUTURE RESEARCH AREAS  
Due to the limited prior research in materiality threshold disclosure, there are many fruitful 
areas for further research. It is also possible that the new Key Audit Matter disclosures (and 
the materiality threshold disclosure that is being adopted by many New Zealand companies 
and auditors) could become the new frontier of audit expectations gap based research. 
First, future studies would benefit from increasing the sample size and using improved 
proxies for non-professional investors. This would increase the participant’s core 
understanding of investing and the purpose of an audit. Further, this can reduce some of the 
more basic definitions that were provided in the research design, for improved statements and 
summaries on company performance (which would increase the validity and realism of 
research design). Master of Business Administration (MBA) students would be best suited by 
this and is supported by various research including research on materiality disclosure (Doxey, 
2013; W. B. Elliott, Hodge, Kennedy, & Pronk, 2007; Holt & DeZoort, 2009). 
Second, as discussed in chapter 6.3, future research would benefit from exploring the third 
link of the audit report impact on decision-making as explained by Libby (1979). 
Specifically, this study identified a significant mean change in investing decision from the ten 
percent materiality disclosure. Future research should explore the long-term impact (payoff) 
of this immediate investment decision reaction that was identified. This would also assist to 
determine the full extent of whether there are long-term benefits of public materiality 
threshold disclosure. 
Third, while this study focused on the disclosure of materiality, the full suite of Key Audit 
Matter disclosures require comment around areas of significant audit risk and judgement 
(ISA (NZ) 701, 2015). It would be beneficial for future research to include all of the potential 
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Key Audit Matters with the materiality threshold disclosure, as this is what current New 
Zealand based companies are providing in practice (aiding realism of the study). However, to 
do this, significant assumptions and judgements will be required as every entity will have 
their own specific set of Key Audit Matters.  
Fourth, while not required by the new auditing standards (ISA (NZ) 701, 2015), New Zealand 
companies and auditors have begun to include the disclosure of materiality thresholds in audit 
reports voluntarily. It would be useful to explore why this has occurred and why not all 
entities have disclosed. Further, it would be beneficial to research the long run trend of 
materiality threshold disclosure to determine whether this is a merely a trend or whether 
materiality threshold disclosure will remain.  
Lastly, chapter 6.2 describes how this study first begun as research on the change in 
materiality threshold disclosure on a lending decision – similar to Ruhnke et al. (2014). 
Specifically, it is identified that the group of lenders who use audit reports may be smaller 
than expected (as evidenced by the lenders approached indicating they did not use audit 
reports in their lending decision). There would be significant benefits in a study that explores 
the true size of the audit report user base, which could indicate the relative importance of 
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13. APPENDIX – EXPERIMENT MATERIALS (FIVE 
PERCENT DISCLOSURE) 
 
Dear Participant:   
 
You are invited to take part in a research study about how financial statement users are 
affected by audit report disclosures. Against a backdrop of the recent Global Financial Crisis, 
regulators such as New Zealand’s Financial Markets Authority have recently instituted 
significant reforms in the area of auditing and financial reporting.  
 
Your participation in this study will greatly enhance our understanding of these issues 
and may help to guide current and future reforms in this area.  Your participation in this 
survey is entirely voluntary and you may exit the survey at any time with no penalty. All 
responses are entirely confidential and will remain anonymous. Further, all information 
collected, including prize draw emails, will be deleted/securely destroyed after the 
submission and publication of my thesis.   
 
As a thank you for your participation, you may go in the draw to WIN a $200 Prezzy Card. 
To enter the draw, please write your email address in the space provided at the end of this 
survey. This prize draw is entirely voluntary and you may complete the survey without 
participating in the prize draw. 
 
This study should take approximately fifteen minutes to complete.   
 
If you have any issues or comments regarding this study, please feel free to ask me any 
questions.  My contact details are given below. Alternatively you may contact my supervisor, 
Associate Professor Richard Fisher (details below). 
 
This research has received approval from the University of Canterbury Educational 
Research Human Ethics Committee. Any complaints may be reported to the Chair, 
Educational Research Human Ethics Committee, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 
4800, Christchurch (human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz).  
 
I thank you for your time in participating in this significant and timely experiment.   
 
Regan Douglas  
Email: regan.douglas@pg.canterbury.ac.nz  
Master of Commerce Student  
University of Canterbury   
 
Richard Fisher  
Email: richard.fisher@canterbury.ac.nz  
Associate Professor, Department of Accounting and Information Systems  
University of Canterbury 
 
 
  88 
 
Format of Survey 
 
You are encouraged to take notes as you proceed through the survey.    
 
As you progress through this survey you will be:    
1) – Provided with company background information for a hypothetical company;   
2) – Provided with company audited financial statement extracts, pre-made ratios, and 
extracts from the audit report;   
3) – Asked to make a hypothetical investment decision;   
4) – Asked a series of additional questions; and   






































Please spend a few minutes reading this section  
 
 
You are to assume that you are considering making an investment decision relating to NZ 
Building Suppliers Ltd, a fictional New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX) listed company. More 
specifically, you are deciding on investing $7,000 of your own funds into existing shares of 
NZ Building Suppliers Ltd for one year, and/or existing NZ Government Bonds paying 6% 
over one year. For the purposes of this experiment, you are to assume you have $7,000 for 
this decision and you would not use the money for any other purpose. 
 
NZ Government Bonds are commonly considered ‘risk free’, however they also generally 
earn a lower return than higher risk investments, such as shares.   
When we buy a new bond we are lending funds to the government in return for the promise 
of receiving a certain fixed interest (coupon) rate.  Government bonds can be traded in the 
market place before maturity.  The value of bonds in the market will depend on how 
desirable their interest rate is at the time. 
Returns from holding shares in listed companies generally comprise of dividend income 
periodically received from the company (i.e., the company distributes all or a portion of its 
profits/reserves back to investors) and capital gains/losses from fluctuations in share price. 
 
NZ Building Suppliers Ltd is a manufacturer and supplier of various building supplies in the 
North Island of New Zealand. Although NZ Building Suppliers Ltd maintains a substantial 
market share in the North Island, a few large competitors exist, notably in the Auckland 
region. Despite the potential for growth due to the Christchurch rebuild, the management of 
NZ Building Suppliers Ltd are not planning on investing in Canterbury in the near future. This 
decision is based on strong competitive pressures from other manufacturers and suppliers in 
the region. 
 
The management of NZ Building Suppliers Ltd expect sales and profits to remain stable over 
the next five years. Over this time, they will be focusing on strengthening the core business 
and repaying debt. The current share price of NZ Building Suppliers Ltd is $6 per share. 
 
NZ Building Suppliers Ltd have a dividend policy of paying out 60% of Net Profit after Tax 
every year.  Consequently, the higher the Net Profit after Tax, the higher the dividends paid 
to shareholders (and vice versa).  Dividends received are in proportion to the number of 
shares held. 
 
NZ Building Suppliers Ltd is audited by a large registered audit firm. The audited financial 
statements and accompanying ratios (produced from the audited statements) are presented 
on the next page.  An audit is designed to provide reasonable assurance (comfort) that the 
financial statements are free from material misstatement (error). 
An audit will therefore impact on the quality of financial information presented which helps 
inform the share price and determine dividends paid. 
 
 











In regard to the 2017 financial performance of NZ Building Suppliers Ltd, did they: 
 Report a Profit  
 Report a Loss  
 Break-even  
 
Is your investment decision in either NZ Buildings Suppliers Ltd and/or NZ Government 
Bonds for a period of: 
 One year 
 Two years 
 Greater than five years 
 
Shares in NZ Building Suppliers Ltd earn return from both dividends and share price 
fluctuation (based on audited financial statements and other factors), whereas NZ 




Shares generally hold a higher risk than NZ Government Bonds but can earn greater returns 




























(1) The opinion provided is considered a ‘clean’ audit opinion – no uncorrected errors were identified outside of the    92 
materiality threshold.  
 
 
Audit Report Extract 
 
Please spend a couple of minutes reading this extract 
 
 
Extracts from the Audit Report 
Opinion:   
In our opinion, the accompanying financial statements, present fairly, in all material respects, 
the financial position of NZ Building Suppliers Ltd as at 31 March 2017, and its financial 
performance and cash flows for the year then ended in accordance with New Zealand 
Equivalents to International Financial Reporting Standards (‘NZ IFRS’) and International 
Financial Reporting Standards (‘IFRS’). (1) See Footnote 
 
Materiality:   
A financial statement-related item is material if its omission or misstatement (error) could 
influence the decisions of financial statement users. As part of the audit process, a 
quantitative materiality threshold (a dollar figure) was determined for the financial statements 
as a whole based on our professional judgement. This threshold was used to assist us in 
identifying and evaluating material misstatements and in judging whether the financial 
statements as a whole were materially misstated. Items falling below the threshold were 
generally considered immaterial (in the absence of relevant qualitative considerations).  
 
The materiality threshold therefore contributes to the basis for our audit opinion. 
 
In this audit, a figure of $180,000 was determined as the dollar materiality threshold and 
was used in forming our audit opinion above. Uncorrected misstatements (either individually 
or in aggregate) below this threshold would not warrant a change in our unqualified (clean) 
audit opinion. In other words, a line item or other disclosure in the financial statements, such 
as net profit after tax, would need to be under or overstated by $180,000 before we would 
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You are now asked to answer the following questions. Please read each question 
carefully and answer them as best you can.  
 
 
Investment Questions:  
 
You are to assume that you have $7,000 to invest in shares of NZ Building Suppliers Ltd 
and/or NZ Government Bonds for one year (investment term is one year).  
The current share price of NZ Building Suppliers Ltd is $6 per share and the current NZ 
Government Bond rate is 6% over one year. You may allocate any ratio of the $7,000 
between these two investments (the total invested must equal $7,000), however you can 
only invest in $1,000 allotments. You may assume no transaction costs. 
 
Please indicate the amounts you would be willing to invest in each investment by ticking 
ONE of the following options: 
 
Please only tick one option: 
 $0 in NZ Building Suppliers Ltd and $7,000 in NZ Government Bonds  
 $1,000 in NZ Building Suppliers Ltd and $6,000 in NZ Government Bonds  
 $2,000 in NZ Building Suppliers Ltd and $5,000 in NZ Government Bonds  
 $3,000 in NZ Building Suppliers Ltd and $4,000 in NZ Government Bonds  
 $4,000 in NZ Building Suppliers Ltd and $3,000 in NZ Government Bonds  
 $5,000 in NZ Building Suppliers Ltd and $2,000 in NZ Government Bonds  
 $6,000 in NZ Building Suppliers Ltd and $1,000 in NZ Government Bonds  
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Other Investment Related Questions: 
 
In your opinion, what is the level of risk associated with investing in NZ Building Suppliers 
Ltd?    
 Very Low Risk  
 Low Risk  
 Somewhat Low Risk  
 Neutral  
 Somewhat High Risk  
 High Risk 
 Very High Risk  
 
 
In your opinion, do you believe that you are a financial risk taker?    
 Strongly Disagree  
 Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  
 Neither Agree nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Agree  
 Agree  
 Strongly Agree 
 
 
Overall, how confident are you in your previous decisions?    
 No Confidence  
 Low Confidence  
 Somewhat Low Confidence  
 Neutral  
 Somewhat Confident  
 Confident  
 Very Confident  
 
 
In your opinion, how reliable is the reported audited net profit after tax figure for NZ Building 
Suppliers Ltd?    
 Very Unreliable  
 Unreliable 
 Somewhat Unreliable 
 Neutral  
 Somewhat Reliable  
 Reliable  
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Indicate (in order of preference) the pieces of information which were most important to your 
decision of how much you invested in NZ Building Suppliers Ltd and/ or NZ Government 
Bonds (listing the number 1 shows this was the most important, and so on). 
______ Company Background 
______ Income Statement  
______ Balance Sheet  
______ Financial Ratios  
______ Audit Report 
 
 
In the audit report extract, what was the quantitative (dollar) threshold for materiality?    
 No dollar amount was disclosed  
 $360,000  




Generally auditors are more concerned with financial statement misstatements (errors) that 
are: 
 Material  
 Immaterial  
 Either material or immaterial (no distinction between the two)  
 
 
Where a misstatement in the financial statements is identified that is below the materiality 
dollar threshold (and where there are no other qualitative factors that indicate a material 
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Demographic Questions:   
 
What is your gender?   
 Female  
 Male  
 
 
What is your expected Degree and Major? 
Please write down: 
 
                                         
 
 
What is your age?   
 Under 18 years   
 18-19 years   
 20-21 years   
 21-22 years   
 22-23 years  
 23-24 years 
 25+ years  
 
 
Please estimate the number of accounting courses that you have completed at University or 
High School.    
 0  
 1-2  
 3-4  
 5+  
 
 
What is your highest level of education? 
 High school level (e.g. NCEA) 
 Bachelor’s degree 
 Postgraduate degree 
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Please give an estimate of your experience with financial statements    
 Very Inexperienced  
 Inexperienced  
 Somewhat Inexperienced  
 Neutral  
 Somewhat Experienced  
 Experienced  
 Very Experienced  
 
 
Please give an estimate of your experience with audit reports    
 Very Inexperienced  
 Inexperienced  
 Somewhat Inexperienced  
 Neutral  
 Somewhat Experienced  
 Experienced  
 Very Experienced  
 
 
Have you ever bought or sold real company shares or debt securities (This excludes 
Kiwisaver investments)?    
 Yes  
 No  
 
 
Do you plan on making any investments in the next five years? Note: this excludes Kiwisaver 
(or equivalent)   
 Yes  
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End of Experiment 
 
Thank you!   
You have now completed the survey.  
Your responses are appreciated and will be of great value to my research and the 
accounting profession.   
 
Just as a reminder: all responses will remain anonymous and confidential. Further, all 
responses will be securely deleted upon the submission and publication of my research.   
 
As a thank you for your participation you are encouraged to go into the draw to win a $200 
Prezzy Card. This prize draw is voluntary and you do not have to enter - your responses will 
still be counted if you choose not to enter. 
 
Please add your email address below to enter the draw: 
 
 
 
 
 
